Keeping the Americans in : The Impact of Afghanistan on Transatlantic Relations within NATO by Vestgården, Thomas
  
Keeping the Americans in  
 
The Impact of Afghanistan on Transatlantic 
Relations within NATO  
 
Thomas Vestgården 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Masteroppgave i Statsvitenskap  
Institutt for Statsvitenskap 
 
UNIVERSITETET I OSLO  
 
Høst 2010 
 
Word Count: 31 825 
 
 
 
II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
Keeping the Americans in 
The Impact of Afghanistan on Transatlantic Relations within NATO 
IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Forfatter 
2010 
Keeping the Americans in 
Thomas Vestgården 
http://www.duo.uio.no/ 
Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo 
V 
 
Abstract 
The fundamental inquiry that motivates this thesis is: to illuminate in what way, and to 
what extent, NATO’s operations in Afghanistan have affected the Alliance. More 
specifically, how NATO has adapted to American initiatives of transformation in light 
of the war in Afghanistan, and the American paradigm of War on Terror. Transatlantic 
relations within NATO is my subject, and Afghanistan is my chosen case. The 
question I strive to answer is whether Afghanistan specifically, and the War on Terror 
in general, has wielded a dividing or unifying effect upon the Alliance. I do so by 
studying the political, organizational and military impact of its Afghan engagement on 
NATO. I analyze changes within the alliance in regard to these three dimensions, and 
the Alliance's process of transformation between 2001 and 2010. All in reference to 
the War on Terror as the US's ruling security paradigm and NATO's involvement in 
Afghanistan.  
In conclude that: the impact of Afghanistan, in the context of the War on Terror, has 
moved from initially creating a high degree of political unity and exposing 
organizational and military division. To increased military interoperability and 
comprehensive, albeit flawed, organizational adaptation to American initiatives, and 
thus a lessening of the division in regard to these two dimensions, while the political 
unity since 2006 has suffered greatly, mainly due to inadequate burden-sharing in 
Afghanistan. 
The theories of realism and liberal institutionalism were employed to theoretically 
illuminate the analysis. As a whole, in this case, realism wielded the highest degree of 
explanatory power of the two.  
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1 Introduction 
As the heads of state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members met 
to celebrate its sixtieth anniversary in 2009, the alliance, that was originally created to 
deter or fight a conventional war on European soil, found itself embroiled in the 
seventh year of unconventional combat in distant Afghanistan. The UN mandated, 
NATO commanded International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is the Alliance’s 
largest operation to date, and is together with the Afghan National Army (ANA) 
responsible for the security of the entire vast and mountainous country. Over the last 
few years death tolls have risen sharply making 2009 the deadliest year since the 
invasion and this bloodstained trend continues in 2010. There is no doubt the Afghan 
experience will leave its mark on the Alliance. Some even go as far as questioning 
whether failure might ultimately hold the potential of making Afghanistan the burial 
ground of the transatlantic Alliance (e.g. Rupp 2006; Kay & Khan 2007; Menon 2008; 
Noetzel & Schreer 2009 and Ibrahim 2009). The question under scrutiny for this thesis 
is the nature and extent of this mark, and its consequences for the transatlantic 
dynamic of NATO.    
America’s relationship with, and attitude towards, NATO has been a subject of 
concern throughout the history of the alliance. The original main challenges and 
purposes of the NATO alliance were quite poetically, however somewhat bluntly, 
summed up in the undying words of its first Secretary General the British Lord Ismay:  
“To keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in”. Of the three 
only the latter still remains as relevant to this day. Although the challenges to NATO 
may have been reduced in number, the one remaining challenge is widely considered, 
to put it dramatically, to be a matter of life and death for the relevance of the ageing 
Alliance in today’s game of international politics. If one looks to the purely military 
side of the matter the US with its overwhelming military power always has been, and 
in the foreseeable future remains, a sine qua non for a militarily strong and relevant 
NATO. Some argue, however, there is much more to NATO than the purely military. 
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The proponents of this line of thought speak of the alliance as a transatlantic security 
community (e.g. Hallams 2009, Hallams 2010). 
Today, as it has been before, Afghanistan is the centre of attention for the great powers 
of the world. The quickest glance at history will reveal that this is not the first time this 
tribal country is at the international centre stage. Afghanistan lived through the toil and 
torment of being a pawn in the Great Game of Central Asia played out by the British 
and the Russian in the 19th century. Pinned between the mighty Russian bear in the 
north and the vast British Empire to the south – Afghanistan – is where they clashed. 
Twice invaded by the British, first in 1839 then again in 1878, and repeatedly menaced 
by several border disputes wherein Russia seized northern Afghan territory. 
Afghanistan’s borders to the south and north are to this day a product of the Great 
Game, and run dividing lines through tribal communities. Despite their efforts and 
extensive sacrifices neither the British nor the Russians ever gained complete control 
over the rugged terrain of Afghanistan and its ferociously independent people. (See: 
Hammes 2006:Chap.11) 
Taking a leap forward in time Afghanistan once again found itself in the thick of 
international power politics as the Soviet tanks rolled over its northern border in 
December 1979. In the context of the all encompassing Cold War, Afghanistan once 
again served as the arena for the battle of the titans. The great powers of the world may 
have changed, this time around it was the Soviet Union and the US that fought it out, 
but the venue stayed the same – Afghanistan. The conflict between the Red Army and 
the American backed Mujahedin Islamic fighters was to go on for nine years before 
the Soviet Union backed out after failing to stabilize the country. Chaos and Civil War 
was to follow. After years of stride the Taliban movement rose to power in 1996 
bringing stability to Afghanistan at the price of a, by any internationally recognized 
human rights standard, horrifically oppressive regime. The world did not pay much 
heed. That is, until the happenings of September 11th 2001 were to change the world 
of international politics and the future of Afghanistan forever. The bitter irony of 
course being that the US and NATO today are facing many of their old bedfellows 
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from the insurgent war on the Soviet Union, in which they backed the Islamic 
Mujahedin. (See: Barth 2008)   
Deserved or not, the Afghanistan that the US and later NATO has entered as part of 
the War on Terror has gained quite a reputation as the burial ground of great powers. 
Time and time again it has proven resilient to foreign influence and even invasion 
(Hammes 2006:Chap.11). NATO’s presence in Afghanistan is, as these words are 
written, beginning on its eight year. Sharp tongued, however humorously inclined, 
critics may say that NATO seems to have taken on the Olympic spirit in Afghanistan: 
the important thing is not to win, but to participate.  
Claims of, and debates surrounding, the theme of disproportionate sharing of the 
human and economical burden placed upon the members of the Alliance is nothing 
new. On the contrary it is a reoccurring theme throughout the time of the transatlantic 
Alliance (e.g. Rupp 2006; Sperling and Webber 2009; Hallams 2010; Ringsmose 
2010). With the war in Afghanistan evolving into its current shape of counter-
insurgency (COIN) operations, which are immensely costly both in terms of time, 
money and human lives, the issue has received new vigor. US Secretary of Defence 
Robert Gates spoke on the issue in remarkably candid words before a US 
congressional committee in 2008 when he told them that he feared the development of 
“a two-tiered alliance in which you have some allies willing to fight and die to protect 
people's security and others who are not” (Reuters US 2008). As I shall proceed to 
illustrate, one may trace the echo of Secretary Gates’ words into the recent academic 
writings on the Alliance as well. Much has been written and said since the Cold War 
ended on what Waltz (2000:18) has called “the strange case of NATO” which seems to 
never die. Some may claim NATO is on its death bed – the debate, however, could 
hardly be more alive.    
Compared to the times of the Cold War the nineties showed us a remarkably different 
NATO than had been before the fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. As the 
sudden changes of the early nineties ushered in a new era of world politics, so did the 
9/11 attacks which brought us the “War on Terror”. The US National Security Strategy 
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(NSS) of 2002 states that “The United States of America is fighting a war against 
terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or 
religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism— premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against innocents” (NSS 2002). As is debated in the theory 
section (Chapter 2) of this thesis, the origins and drivers of major change in 
international organizations is a controversial topic. What is blatant for everyone to 
observe, however, is that change does occur. We must thus ask ourselves; how and 
why has the American paradigm of War on Terror changed NATO compared to the 
times before 2001 and the Afghan War? As Dale (2006:1) writes: “Afghanistan has … 
become a test of NATO's ability to transform itself and adapt to the post-9/11 threat 
environment.” 
1.1 Literary Review and Research Question 
There exists a trend in the recent literature written on NATO and transatlantic security 
relations towards painting NATO’s mission in Afghanistan as a case of do or die for 
the ageing alliance. The future of NATO as a relevant actor in mattes of international 
security is deemed to be highly dependent on the fate of the ISAF mission. Examples 
of this quite prominent line of thought are: Rupp (2006), Kay & Khan (2007), Menon 
(2008), Noetzel & Schreer (2009) and Ibrahim (2009). The arguments here are that 
NATO, as demonstrated by its highly marginal role in Afghanistan from 2001-2003, 
has failed to find (be given) a purpose in the post-9/11 world and the new ruling 
paradigm of US security policy that is the War on Terror – and therefore is living on 
borrowed time. In an essay with the telling title R.I.P. NATO published in The 
American Interest in 2008 Menon writes: 
NATO’s problem is that its purpose is no longer clear, even to its own 
members. In several key NATO states, few people know what the alliance does, 
let alone how it serves their interests. And who can blame them? Just try to 
define the present purpose of NATO as a military alliance in a sentence, even a 
long sentence. It’s not easy as it once was…  
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Although NATO since 2003 has been given an increasingly central role in 
Afghanistan, the Alliance has, so far, failed to achieve its mission objective that is to 
stabilize the country. This, is argued, will be the end of the Alliance as the US in the 
future will turn elsewhere in times of trouble. Afghanistan is painted up to be a litmus 
test for the alliance. A test that can only hold two possible outcomes – success or 
failure – and failure is something that NATO can not afford to overcome. Afghanistan 
is deemed to have profoundly divided the allies. Noetzel and Schreer (2009:544) write:  
The political wounds from the ISAF mission will ...haunt the Atlantic alliance 
and will put brakes on its military engagements. Thus failure in Afghanistan 
would put strong limitations on the alliance’s future scope and role as an 
international security actor. 
Even more plainly spoken is Rupp (2006:155) when he argues that “Failure in 
Afghanistan would be devastating for NATO”. This line of thought is by no means 
exclusive to the academic sphere. US Army Colonel Booth (2008:2) proposes that 
“NATO's success or failure in Afghanistan has critical implications for it's 
transformation into a relevant, capable, and willing alliance in the 21th century.” 
On the other hand, however, there are scholars like Hallams (2010), Sperling & 
Webber (2009) and Thies (2009) who interpret Afghanistan and ISAF to be yet another 
in a long line of cases that have (wrongfully) been foretold to be the swan song of the 
Alliance; from the Suez crisis in the 1950s, the French withdrawal from the Command 
Structure in 1966, through the troubled times of losing its nemesis with the demise of 
the Soviet Union, to the Balkan operations in the 1990s and lastly the thanks, but no 
thanks response of the Bush administration to the Alliance offering its solidarity on the 
12th of September 2001.  
The advocates of this position point to that NATO’s shared values and institutions 
makes the Alliance suited to adapt to changes in circumstances. They underline that 
NATO’s entire development has taken the form of adaptations to external crisis such 
as those mentioned above, and not premeditated strategic choices. They further argue 
that NATO has not only adapted, it has done so remarkably well. NATO has endured 
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many a major crisis, and although Afghanistan and ISAF surely will effect and leave 
its mark on the alliance, the operation does not in their view hold the potential seeds of 
NATO’s demise. Sperling and Webber (2009:491) write: 
NATO has faced imminent collapse so often that it is difficult to take seriously 
the latest judgement that its days are numbered. …NATO seems to possess an 
inexhaustible capacity for recovery, a characteristic NATO pessimists largely 
ignore.   
Thies (2009:1) writes on the many eulogies written for NATO over the years:  
Looking back over the history of the Alliance, there seems to have been scarcely 
a year when it [NATO] was not widely said to be in crisis, or at least in 
disarray. 
Examining the literature a central, and highly contested, question that thus warrants 
further scholarly investigation is: To what extent does NATO’s engagement in 
Afghanistan actually represent a litmus test for the development of the US-NATO 
relationship, and thus the future of NATO as a relevant security policy actor? This, 
however, is a question that can not be fully answered at the present time, as the 
operations are still ongoing and the ramifications of the Afghan engagement may not 
be revealed for years to come after any future withdrawal. Many, for instance, hold 
that the ultimate ramifications of NATO’s Operation Allied Force (OAF) in Kosovo in 
1999 did not become apparent until the US left NATO on the sidelines in its War on 
Terror in October 2001 (e.g Hallams 2010:61, Rupp 2006:70). To circumvent the 
issues of proposing to foretell the future the question of Afghanistan’s ultimate impact 
on NATO will have to wait for future scholarly endeavors. The years that have passed 
since the US, and later NATO, entered the theatre of Afghanistan, and up to 2010 
should, however, provide substantial ground for analysis of the engagement's impact 
upon the Alliance thus far. 
As this short review reveals, much has been written on the subject of NATO and 
Afghanistan. It can be argued, however, that to a very little extent the existing 
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literature differentiates between the various aspects – separate dimensions – of the 
Alliance. I propose and hypothesize that the Afghan engagement very possibly has 
wielded a different effect on the military or organizational dimension of NATO 
matters, than the political. A monolithic analytical concept of NATO does not leave 
room for this differentiation and is thus prone to simplification in assessing the impact 
of Afghanistan on the Alliance. Afghanistan and ISAF may, for instance, have been a 
politically dividing experience for the alliance, while at the same time providing for 
tighter military cooperation through the seven years of fighting together in 
Afghanistan. An analytical concept that takes such differences into consideration will 
provide for a more nuanced analysis and therefore a potentially higher degree of 
validity. 
In analyzing the Afghan War’s impact upon transatlantic relations within NATO I 
have utilized two main analytical concepts: unity and division. Unity and Division are 
for the purpose of this thesis to be understood as opposite extremes of a broad 
spectrum. In my analysis (and elsewhere) I use the non-static terms unifying and 
dividing as to illustrate in which way the analysis indicates the phenomenon in 
question to be moving the Alliance along the spectrum.     
Table 1: Three Dimensions of Unity and Division 
Unity         Division 
By studying the political, organizational and military impact of the Afghan 
engagement on NATO, this thesis will contribute to the above outlined discussion on 
the present and future development of the transatlantic security relations. The 
Pol. 
Org. 
Mil 
Moderatly 
Dividing Effect 
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originality of the thesis lies within the structuring of the empirical findings in the 
manner of these three dimensions which I proceed to define in Chapter 3. Within each 
sub-section I also operationalize what is meant by the two key terms of unity and 
division in relevance to the specific dimension.  
The overarching research question I ask is thus: 
To what extent has NATO's Afghan engagement, so far, served to be a source of 
greater transatlantic unity, or a source of division, within the Alliance? 
Throughout the analysis the research question is treated in its grander context of the 
paradigm of War on Terror. 
 
In order to answer my research question I begin by discussing the theoretical 
framework of the thesis in Chapter 2. Then I in Chapter 3 proceed to detail the 
methodology applied. Chapter 4 is divided into four sub-chapters, one for each time 
period of the analysis, all of which are concluded by an assessment of the three 
dimensions of unity and division.  Finally in Chapter 5 I present the key empirical 
outcomes and theoretical implications. 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
The task at hand for this thesis is analyzing the impact of the Afghanistan engagement 
on the transatlantic dynamic of the Alliance, and assessing the implications of that 
impact. What I shall aspire to unveil in my empirical investigation are signs of whether 
Afghanistan has been a generator of greater unity and alliance cohesion across the 
Atlantic, or if the Afghan experience has been a force driving the US and the other 
allies apart. All in reference to the political, the organizational and the military 
dimensions of the Alliance. It can be argued that the two meta-theories of Realism and 
Liberalism can make better sense of, categorize as well as contextualize and explain 
my findings.  
The present academic debate on NATO is to a large extent analogue to, and fits in to 
the greater picture of, the debate between realist and liberal institutionalists over the 
future of NATO that emerged with the end of the Cold War1. Realist theory deems 
alliances to in their very nature be inheritably temporary as they are a product of 
external circumstances. Once the external threat disappear – so does the glue 
sustaining and creating alliance cohesion and effectively holding the allies together. 
The development from the US and Soviet Union’s great alliance against Hitler into 
their belligerency during the Cold War is the quintessential empirical example of this 
realist brand of alliance theory. The prominent realist scholar Kenneth Waltz 
proclaimed before the US Senate as early as 1990 that “NATO is a disappearing thing” 
(Quoted in Hallams 2009:39). With the benefit of hindsight it is however clear that the 
end of NATO would in fact not follow from the end of the Cold War. There exists 
both a realist and a liberalist way to interpret and explain this development. 
I terms of realism NATO has persevered because it, despite the fall of its nemesis and 
initial reason for being as we entered the nineties, was deemed by its member states to 
still serve their national interests. As the international structure that shapes the national 
                                                 
1
 For some important contributions in this debate see: Mearsheimer (1990); Waltz (1993), (1997) and (2000); 
Wholforth (1995); Keohane & Martin (1995); McCalla (1996a); McCalla (1996b); Haftendorn, Keohane & 
Wallander (1999); Keohane (2002) 
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interests of the worlds sovereign states evolved after the end of the Cold War – so did 
NATO by moving out of area. Waltz again wrote on the subject, ten years the wiser, in 
2000 (p. 18) following NATO’s two wars in the Balkans:  “Far from invalidating 
realist theory or casting doubt on it, however, the recent history of NATO illustrates 
the subordination of international institutions to national purposes.”  
Realism argues that states are the only actors of importance. States are unitary, rational 
and amoral actors in pursuit of fulfillment of their national interests, and their primary 
motivating force is the international structure – which is anarchy. Being that states find 
themselves to be in a realm of anarchy they are preoccupied with power and security, 
and are predisposed towards conflict. As gains won or loss alters the power balance 
between states, the fear of war leads them to perceive gains in relative terms. 
Cooperation through international organizations that might very well be beneficial to 
the state in absolute terms in an isolated context is, despite this, not engaged in on the 
basis of fears of even greater gains awarded to other states. International law and 
institutions are therefore little but formalizations of already existing state behavior and 
unspoken practices that have been hammered out in the Darwinist world of anarchy 
and power long before they reach the assemblies of the UN. These basic propositions 
of realism add up to a negative prospect towards the degree of potential influence 
wielded by international organizations, like NATO. As realist J. M. Grieco (1988:488) 
writes: “…international institutions affect cooperation [between states] only 
marginally”. The realist position towards international organizations is therefore quite 
adequately contained within the metaphorical picture of international organizations as 
arenas for the advancement of the national interest of the states that fund and sustain 
them. 
Liberal institutionalists however suggests that the reasons for NATO’s perseverance 
are to find largely within the organization itself. As the O in the Alliance’s famous 
acronym reveals NATO is no mere traditional alliance in line with the above 
mentioned WWII example. On the contrary NATO is an international organization 
with its own Secretary General to go along with its very own bureaucracy and 
institutional framework. Furthermore the proponents of the liberalist line of thought 
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speak much more frequently of NATO as a security community2 than an old fashioned 
alliance. The emphasis is placed on democracy and shared values. As opposed to 
realism’s amoral interest driven state actors, liberal institutionalism views the state as 
an actor significantly moderated by normative beliefs, values and ideas.        
…when the alliance experiences periods of tension and crisis, the shared values 
that bind member states together prove sufficiently strong to weather the storm. 
…there still exists within the alliance a strong spirit of “transatlantic 
community”; while this may have been tested in recent years it remains central 
to understanding how NATO has managed not only to survive beyond the end of 
the Cold War, but reinvent itself in a changing strategic landscape 
(Hallams 2010:9)     
A very high degree of explanatory power is attributed to shared values in assessing 
NATO’s perseverance Hallams (2010:16) claims that “It was the sense of Atlantic 
community that helped NATO survive the tensions of the Cold War years”.  She goes 
on to state that “ …the shared values and ideals that bound the alliance together 
proved stronger than the disputes that threatened to tear the alliance apart” (Hallams 
2010:17). 
Even though liberal institutionalism, like realism, recognizes that states operate in an 
environment of anarchy, the behavioral expectations drawn from this assumption 
differ greatly. International regimes and international institutions are together with 
states the main unites of analysis. One of the leading scholars within the school of 
liberal institutionalism namely R. Keohane defines regimes as “persistent and 
connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, 
constrain activity, and shape expectations” (Keohane 1989:2). In opposition to 
realism, liberal institutionalism regards regimes and international institutions as able to 
constrain and impact on state behavior. As Hallams (2010:4) points out: “Leading 
institutionalist such as Keohane (2002), Robert B. McCalla (1996a) and G. John 
                                                 
2
 This term is also closely associated with the theory of constructivism (e.g. Williams & Neumann 2000). In this 
thesis however I shall keep to the liberal intitutionalist concept of security community. 
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Ikenberry (2001) have all focused on the institutional adaptation of NATO as the key 
to its survival”. NATO’s institutional adaptations to the American paradigm of War on 
Terror is, in reference to this, part of the analysis conducted in this thesis. Implications 
of the failures and successes of that adaptation, in light of the theoretical framework, 
are discussed in the final concluding Chapter. 
The stance, identified in the literature and outlined in Chapter 1, that anything but 
success for NATO in Afghanistan would effectively mean the beginning of the end for 
the Alliance, is rooted in the theory of realism. This becomes apparent if one 
scrutinizes the implicit theoretical underpinnings of the argument. The argument is 
highly state centered and presupposes that it is the national interests of the Alliances’ 
by far most powerful member – the US – that in the end determines the future 
relevance of NATO as a key player on the international security arena. And if the 
Allies cannot muster up the ability to help the US achieve its goals Washington will 
look elsewhere to conduct operations in the future. This is in line with realisms’ state 
centralism and emphasis on power as the lifeblood of international relations.  
Furthermore the proponents of this position underline the deep divide created across 
the Atlantic by the highly differing views on the War on Terror. The War on Terror, 
they argue, has not proved sufficient to conjure up alliance unity in the manner of the 
apocalyptic threats of the Cold War. Rupp (2006:2-3) writes: 
Although NATO members have made considerable efforts to identify new 
threats and missions, since 1991 no unifying set of priorities has surfaced. 
Many dangers to Western security have emerged in the post-Cold War period – 
the rise of Al Qaeda is arguably the most significant – however, these issues 
have not unified the NATO members in common purpose. In absence of a 
menace to their vital interests… NATO will continue to prove less and less 
valuable to its members with each passing year. 
The implicit link to realism here is that the (lacking) source of Alliance unity is 
defined to be external. More precisely the lacking unity is explained by the absence of 
a sufficiently powerful external threat to hold the alliance together and create internal 
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cohesion. NATO unity and cohesion is thus solely a product of its member states 
responding to the external environment that is the international structure – and not 
something that is built and sustained from within. 
Moreover, the emphasis placed upon, and the dividing power accredited to, the 
(im)balance of military capabilities between the US and the other allies is greater 
viewed through the realist lens, as opposed to the liberal institutional lens. In an 
alliance construed as a security community the value of military contributions will to a 
larger degree be measured in terms of the political legitimacy and the commitment to 
the community they bring to bear, contrary to a more materialistic measurement of fire 
power. In the liberal institutional view of NATO being a formalization and sustainer of 
transatlantic cultural and political brotherhood, in the form of a security community; it 
can be argued that the form and size of military contributions, matter less than the 
political act of contribution that lies within any military contribution. Thus, by 
extension the nature of the military capabilities of the European allies matter less. 
Furthermore, while the liberal institutional position viewed the turn to non-existential 
military engagements that followed the end of the Cold War as hearkening an era of 
optimism and increased cooperation, in general, as well as within the field of security. 
The overarching and all encompassing Cold War had kept frozen many a potential 
area of cooperation for international organizations including NATO. The realists, 
however, saw the end of the Cold War as destabilizing and a threat – not a boost – to 
international cooperation (Mearsheimer 1990, Wholforth 1995). Smaller military 
engagements, in pursuit of limited political aims, made a comeback in the early 
nineties. As an illustration former Norwegian Chief of Defence General Sverre Diesen 
draws a parallel back to the old days of limited kabinetkrieg (Diesen 2005). One must, 
however, note that these limited military operations where as a rule not unilateral, and 
the early nineties were to be known as the high years of UN-interventionism. Much of 
the optimism surrounding the utility of military force as a limited political tool, in an 
almost Clausewitzian manner, went down along with the infamous Black Hawk 
helicopter that was shot down over the streets of Mogadishu as early as 1993, and what 
ever optimism for the utility of military force was left dead after the tragic events of 
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the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and the preceding inaction of the international 
community (Hooker 2009). 
The core of the matter, and this is where the two theories differ, is whether the 
downfall of the Soviet Union opened the door for wider and more cooperation, or 
whether the lack of an external enemy creating internal cohesion made greater room 
for the actions of the member states to be guided by what Brenner (1993:138,142) 
coined as pursuit of “a more narrow conception of national interest”. In a “non-
existential” conflict such as NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan one would from a 
realist perspective expect the actions of the member states to be guided by just such a 
narrower conception of national interest at the expense of the common good. This is in 
line with the classical concept of free riding, and the problems of collective actions 
and collective goods (See: Lepgold 1998, Sandler 2000). The removal of the threat of 
global terrorism can be viewed as just such a non-excludable and non-rivalrous 
collective good. These problems should, however, in accordance with realism be 
overridden if there exists an adequate external threat forcing cohesion upon the allies. 
This is an interesting proposition in terms of the quite substantial set of national 
caveats placed upon troops in ISAF. 
To sum up, in realism the Alliance is thus defined to be an arena for the interest of its 
most powerful member(s) to play out within, and not an actor in its own right. Liberal 
institutionalism however underlines NATO’s historic record of perseverance and its 
development into a value based security community, and thus reads Afghanistan and 
the future of NATO in this light. The validity of these theoretically founded arguments 
here presented is empirically explored in the concluding chapter. It is an ambition that 
this thesis might be but a small contribution also in this grander theoretical debate. 
In the next chapter I will discuss the Research Methodology. 
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3 Research Methodology 
There are, as with all things in life and science, both advantages and disadvantages to 
every method, and a list of possible pitfalls to be navigated if one is to keep to the 
appropriate standard of validity and reliability. In the following I present a deliberation 
over my methodological choices. First I will discuss the “longitudinally divided Single 
Case Study” methodology. Then I will discuss the definitions of the three analytical 
concepts, and operationalize what is meant by unifying and dividing in reference to 
each dimension. Finally, I discuss the concept of caveats and its implications for the 
analysis. 
3.1 Single Case Study 
My object of study is NATO unity. Single N case study is my research design. The 
present war in Afghanistan is my chosen case. The American, and subsequently 
NATO, led Afghanistan War is here a case of a major external event impacting on an 
international organization. NATO’s adaptation to American led alliance 
transformation, and Europe’s role in the Afghan War over the last decade are the 
issues I wish to directly illuminate in order to answer my research question. What I 
ultimately aspire to shed light on is the mechanisms driving change and cooperation in 
international organizations. As for method I will apply within case time comparison. 
Consequently longitudinally dividing the original single case in to two (or more) units 
(in my case four), divided by time and thus facilitating analytical comparison. George 
and Bennett (2005:166-167) gives this method the highly describing name of the 
“before and after” method. The analysis will build on relevant published research, 
NATO, UN and government documents. As to ensure the validity of the findings, 
claims are as much as possible founded in multiple sources.  
The major advantage of this quasi-experimental method is that, given that the units of 
comparison in reality are the same units at different points in time, there are a lot of 
variables naturally held constant. The main challenge to the validity of the analysis is 
isolating the causally relevant variables from the almost endless list of possible 
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variables that may or may not have effected upon the alliance in my period of interest 
which spans from 2001 to 2010. This thesis will, with one minor – but quite important 
– exception, deal exclusively with the impact of the Afghanistan War. That exception 
is a brief deliberation of the transatlantic effects of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-
2010), which were of such a magnitude that they not only directly affected NATO’s 
Afghanistan effort, but carried so much weight of their own that any discussion of 
transatlantic relations in over the last decade would be hampered if one did not 
somehow deal with the impact of Iraq. Having said that, the analysis herein conducted 
is solely devoted to the transatlantic impact of the War on Terror within NATO 
manifested through the War in Afghanistan. 
My chosen “before” – my baseline – for comparison is the year 1999 which is the year 
that marks the Alliances 50th anniversary. It was also the year the Alliance adopted its 
former Strategic Concept3, and it is the year that NATO for the first time ever 
conducted offensive combat operations, on Belgrade in OAF. Furthermore 1999 will 
be remembered as a watershed in the sense that former Warsaw-Pact states were 
included into the Alliance. At that time there was no such concept as the War on 
Terror guiding US foreign policy. September 11
th
 2001 marked the beginning of a new 
era in American security strategy. The terrorist attack set off the chain of events that 
ended in the invasion of Afghanistan on October 7
th
 the same year. NATO’s 
involvement at this time was limited to the maritime efforts of Operation Active 
Endeavour (OAE) patrolling the Mediterranean Sea. Theatrical involvement under 
NATO command was not realised until October 2003. Two years had then past since 
the initial US led invasion. How did NATO change in the time between 2001 - 2003? 
Did NATO adapt to the novel realities of the new paradigm of War on Terror? By 
setting NATO’s 2003 entry into Afghanistan as the first of the “after” points of 
comparison, my analysis will aim to answer these questions. The next watershed is the 
completion of ISAF’s geographical expansion in 2006 when NATO assumed 
responsibility for the entirety of Afghanistan. I have chosen the period 2003 - 2006 as 
                                                 
3
 Which was replaced at the Lisbon summit of November 2010 
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the next period of comparison. The third period of comparison is 2006 – 2009 during 
which the Afghan campaign changed dramatically in nature started to develop into a 
COIN operation. This, as I explore in the analysis, affected the allies greatly. The 
fourth and final period in time chosen is 2009 - 2010. January 2009 marked the first 
change of American President since the start of the War on Terror. The first two years 
of Obama’s presidency form the last analytical period of my analysis. 
Central to the analysis is assessing NATO's adaptation to the US paradigm of War on 
Terror. In order to achieve this one needs a clear understanding of what the War on 
Terror entails and how it has evolved since 2001. The shift from the first, to the second 
Bush Administration in 2005, and the change brought by the introduction of the 
Obama White House in 2009 are the most significant watersheds. To gain a measure 
of how the concept of the War on Terror has evolved in the period the American 
National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) are 
utilized. The NSS is the supreme strategy document of the US drafted by the President 
and is purposely general in content. The NMS on the other hand is written by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff while guided by the NSS and brings the provisions of the guiding 
document down to a more specific level. Together they form a picture of the ruling 
American security paradigm at the time of their conception. From Bush in 2002 to 
Obama's 2010 NSS there have been significant changes, as well as equally significant 
continuities, in the conceptualization of the War on Terror. This development is 
incorporated into the analysis. 
3.2 Operationalizing Unity and Division 
In my analysis I evaluate the impact of the War in Afghanistan and the American 
paradigm of War on Terror on NATO’s transformation. Transformation, for the 
purpose of this thesis, is expressions of allied adaption to US initiatives for change in 
NATO. As to avoid a monolithic concept of NATO that might obscure as much as it 
enlightens, I have, as mentioned in the introduction, divided the analysis in accordance 
with three analytical dimensions. This allows for the analysis to differentiate, 
recognize and incorporate forces pulling in different and perhaps opposing directions 
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within NATO, which in turn provides the opportunity for a more nuanced analysis, 
and thus potentially greater validity. 
3.2.1 The Political Dimension 
NATO is and remains an intergovernmental consensus based organization made up of 
28 sovereign member states. The politics of NATO thereby is a bargain composed of a 
variety of national interests, brought to the table by states of greatly varying 
economical and military power. The most powerful of which is the US. The remaining 
27 allies have their own national interest which may, or may not, correspond to the 
American point of view. Major external events like the terrorist attacks of 9/11 should, 
however, according to realist theory unite the allies, as a common threat creates 
converging national interests and suppresses divergent ones. NATO more so than other 
international organizations tends to be viewed as an actor in its own right, as opposed 
to being a mere arena, and an aggregation of its many sovereign members, where 
consensus is the rule of decision. This is a consequence of NATO’s Cold War legacy 
where the bipolar situation lent itself to a simplified picture of the world in terms of 
two unitary blocks (Berdal & Ucko 2010:102).  
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the arena where the allies either clash or 
conform in the setting of NATO’s political course, and it is the alliance’s supreme 
decision making forum. This makes it highly relevant in terms of shedding light on 
whether Afghanistan has wielded a unifying or dividing influence in regards to the 
political dimension of the Alliance. The NAC has effective political authority and 
powers of decision. It is the principal decision-making body and oversees the political 
and military process relating to security issues affecting the whole Alliance. It can 
meet at the level of Permanent Representatives (or Ambassadors), at the level of 
Foreign and Defence Ministers, and at the level of Heads of State and Government. It 
is chaired by the Secretary General. Permanent Representatives act on instruction from 
their capitals, informing and explaining the views and the policy decisions of their 
governments to their colleagues around the table. The Council has an important public 
profile and issues declarations and communiqués explaining the Alliance's policies and 
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decisions. The decelerations produced by the NAC, as well as documents from the 
NATO bureaucracy, serve as part of the basis for the analysis. 
Precisely describing and creating a coherent definition of political unity and political 
division is a major challenge. And may in fact be the main shortcoming of the NATO 
literature at large. Thies (2009:7) writes on the much used academic concept of “crisis 
in the Alliance” which is closely related to my analytical concept of division. 
None of the many writers who have contributed to the NATO-in-crisis literature 
have defined their terms in a way that would permit a disinterested observer to 
know when the Alliance is in crisis and when it is not. Nor do they 
conceptualize these episodes in a way that would make it possible to reconcile 
conflicting claims about the relative severity of various crises or even about 
when they being and end. Instead, judgments about whether the Alliance is in 
crisis and how bad the situations has become are typically based on indicators 
like harsh language, petty behavior, or the number of points at issue among 
members. 
So, how does one operationalize political unity and division? As the saying goes, 
actions will always speak louder than words. In opreationalizing political unity and 
division one faces the task of moving beyond rhetoric. As Theis (2006:5) further 
argues “…the widespread reliance on impressionistic evidence has rendered the 
NATO-in-crisis literature inherently subjective and imprecise.”  Therefore, the line of 
inference must run from actions on the ground, such as troop contributions, and then 
onto the political level.  
Harsh choices of words and the number of contested issues are poor indicators of 
division. While such variables at face value may seem as fine measures of a falling 
out, they may, however, also be taken to account for exactly the opposite. Harsh 
exchanges of words through media and diplomatic channels may be indicators that the 
member states are heavily invested in reaching a decision and convinced of the 
importance of persuading their fellow allies. This is particularly the case in instances 
where harsh debate and diverging starting points are followed by decision and action. 
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As for the cases that pan out in indecision and inaction, the presiding quarrels may in 
fact be an indication of division. The point is that harsh debate and rhetorical 
grandstanding in itself does not equal division. Paradoxically the perceived importance 
of alliance unity among the member states may be what drives the actions that are 
subsequently taken into account by observers as signs of division. Take for instance 
the 1999 Belgrade bombing campaign. When bombing commenced on the 24th March 
it was after no less than a full year of diplomatic back and forth across the Atlantic. In 
fact, the American frustrations about the European lack of capabilities and 
interoperability in the field, combined with their political meddling and concerns over 
the legal grounds for war, led to some transatlantic name-calling and has been dubbed 
a major crisis in NATO history (See: Theis 2009). Walker (2001:11) rapports that the 
brusqueness and domination of the US in face of the Kosovo crisis left the Europeans 
and especially the British feeling trampled and aggravated. In spite of this today the 
Kosovo experience is often hailed as NATO’s greatest moment. Hallams (2010:42) 
even goes as far as celebrating it as “a triumph of unity”, and goes on to suggest that 
the success of Kosovo “… is testimony to the ability of the alliance to transcend the 
disagreements and disputes… …and remain unified”. Alliance solidarity withstood the 
test of bringing down Milosevic and cohesion was kept for 78 straight days of 
bombing even without a clear UN-mandate. It is highly paradoxical and misguided to 
take whatever disagreement, or harsh exchange of words, that may have preceded this 
momentous display of alliance unity to account for a divided alliance in crisis.    
As to the number of contested issues this is nothing but an indication of the high 
relevance of the organization in the minds of its members. An international alliance in 
crisis or one suffering deep division is likely to be an alliance out of work; a place of 
silence rather than debate. 
In assessing the political unity and division I have focused on the concept of alliance 
“burden-sharing”. During the Cold War the term ”burden-sharing” in a NATO context 
referred mainly to financial issues such as contributions to the common NATO budget. 
For the purposes of this thesis the term applies to the sharing of the military burden on 
the ground in Afghanistan. Sometimes labelled as “risk-sharing” (for instance Sperling 
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and Webber 2009; Ringsmose 2010). The political will to engage in high-risk 
operations is a sign of a commitment to the unity of the alliance that moves beyond 
rhetoric. Examples of three measurable factors of allied burden-sharing are: i) 
deployment to the south and east, ii) national caveats limiting troops and iii) 
proportion of combat-deaths. 
3.2.2 The Organizational Dimension 
I will analyze the rationales behind, and the consequences of, the alterations made in 
the organizational structure of the alliance in relevant time period (2001-2010). 
The US used the first NATO summit after the 2001 Article 5 invocation, Prague 2002, 
to (re)launch a series of proposals towards the reformation of the Alliance. To what 
extent these proposals, which were passed in 2002, have been realized or not in the 
time up to 2010, will serve as the measure of the Afghanistan engagement's unifying or 
dividing effect. The analysis will aim to reveal to what degree, the alliance which in 
the past has failed to follow-up on US led initiatives to transform, for example the 
Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) of 1999 (Knutsen 2007), in light of the War on 
Terror paradigm and its large role in the War in Afghanistan this time has been able to 
reform. 
The 2002 Prague Summit agreed to establish a new command structure initiated by the 
US, in order for the Alliance to adapt to the realities of the new threat assessments 
following 9/11. The Allied Command Operations (ACO) and the Allied Command 
Transformation (ACT) were established. By 2003 NATO was deeply involved in 
Afghanistan and through ISAF the new command structure has been put to the test.  
At the Prague Summit the allies also agreed to create a NATO Response Force (NRF) 
that was to be a standing force ready to deploy anywhere, at any time, on extremely 
short notice. This was also an American initiative to make NATO more suitable to 
Washington's vision of a NATO adapted to the new War on Terror. The NRF is the 
most significant and most substantial organizational development in NATO over the 
last ten years. Former SACEUR General James Jones called it “one of the most 
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important changes in the North Atlantic Alliance since the signing of the Washington 
treaty” (quoted in Kugler 2007:9). The development of the NRF is thus the main, but 
not the only, focus of the Organizational Dimension. The NRF is not directly 
connected to NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan, but it is an integral part of its 
context that is the War on Terror paradigm, and has been affected by the ISAF 
operation.  
Indicators of successful transformation, in other words – transformation making the 
alliance suitable to the US’s demands, will be signs of greater transatlantic alliance 
unity than occurred before 2002. And indicators of non-successful transformations will 
be signs of unchanged or greater division within the alliance4. 
3.2.3 The Military Dimension 
In terms of the military dimension I shall evaluate the alliances transformation to 
increase the level of military interoperability between the allies. Here, as well, the 
developments of the Prague Summit of 2002 and specifically the PCC, will be at the 
center of the analysis. The degree of successful implementation of the capabilities 
commitments made at the Prague Summit, serves as my indicator of unity and 
division. The PCC consists of a set of concrete commitments for NATO members to 
improve their capabilities in eight areas, either individually or collectively. I shall 
focus on the collective efforts (such as creating common air fueling capabilities), as 
these are the most relevant in addressing my research question, and analyze how the 
implementation either has been impaired or driven forward by the American War on 
Terror paradigm. Here greater unity is operationalized as when PCC implementation 
can be deemed to have been achieved and propelled by the War on Terror paradigm, or 
Alliance’s operations in Afghanistan – or a source of division in the opposite case. 
The very details of transformation programs such as the PCC, and the reports made on 
the member states' progress in fulfilling their requirements, are classified. This is of 
                                                 
4This line of reasoning also applies to the military dimension 
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course due to the military nature of the matter. However, information made public, 
unclassified reports, and indirect indications, can to be used to overcome this challenge 
to reliability in scholarly pursuits such as this (e.g. Ringsmose 2010; Lagoa & Piella 
2010).  
When mentioning the PCC in this context it is important to note that the PCC to a very 
large degree is a new name on an old acquaintance that is the Defence Capabilities 
Initiative (DCI) of 1999. Transformation of military capabilities has been a recurring 
issue for the Alliance ever since the end of the Cold War (see Ringsmose 2010; 
Sperling and Webber 2009).  I wish to emphasize that my claim is not that American 
War on Terror paradigm, and the subsequent snubbing of NATO in relation to 
Afghanistan, caused the US's desire for alliance transformation embodied in the PCC. 
This desire existed well before September 11th 2001. In fact the large similarities 
between the provisions of the DCI and the PCC clearly demonstrate that such a causal 
claim is false. What I do claim, however, is that the initial sidelining of NATO in 
Afghanistan, and the new US security paradigm, served as the central rationale behind 
the re-launching of the transformation efforts under a new and potentially unifying 
heading. Article 3 of the 2002 Prague Declaration makes explicit reference to 9/11, it 
reads: 
Recalling the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and our subsequent decision 
to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, we have approved a 
comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO’s Strategic Concept, to 
strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, 
populations and territory, from wherever they may come. Today's decisions will 
provide for balanced and effective capabilities within the Alliance so that 
NATO can better carry out the full range of its missions and respond 
collectively to those challenges, including the threat posed by terrorism and by 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.” 
The issue of Afghanistan has dominated the NATO agenda ever since 2001 and 
certainly has served as the central context in which the realization of the 
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transformation efforts has occurred. It is in this capacity – as the rationale for re-
launch and context of realization - that I propose to utilize the PCC in shedding light 
on Afghanistan's impact on NATO unity. 
3.3 Caveats 
Caveats are national limitations on what NATO soldiers can, and cannot, do that are 
imposed by the providing state. Each national contingent has a “red card” holder 
which at any time can override the NATO commander and bar the inclusion of that 
sates troops in a certain operation. Some caveats are formal and written, others are 
informal and are products of a constantly running dialogue between the “red card” 
holder in Afghanistan and his home Capital. All caveat details are classified 
information unavailable to the public. The latter mentioned unwritten caveats are 
especially controversial as they severely hamper tactical planning (Austerwald and 
Saideman 2009). 
National caveats placed on troops in international operations are not simply a military 
issue, but very much also a window into the inner workings of international 
multilateral cooperation. States are always weighing the concerns of upholding their 
national sovereignty on the one hand, against beneficial multilateral cooperation that 
requires surrender of a certain degree of that very sovereignty, on the other. Nowhere 
is upholding sovereignty viewed as more paramount than within the realm of security 
and defence. These issues go right to the very core of traditional Westphalian 
statehood. Moreover, the nations are being asked nothing less than to risk the lives of 
its young. This is important to keep in mind when discussing why even NATO cannot 
conjure up caveat-free troop contributions. As Auerswald and Saideman (2009:5) 
writes: “Even NATO, the most powerful, institutionalized and successful security 
organization in the world is bound by this limitation [caveats]”. 
The field of security and military cooperation requires the highest extent of strategic 
thinking and centralized planing. As Sun Tzu thought us – tactics without strategy is 
merely the noise before defeat. These counter working forces of national sovereignty 
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and the need for international coherence makes security cooperation uniquely 
interesting in a scholarly perspective. And makes it evermore interesting to explore 
how international organizations precisely within the field of security handle these 
challenges. 
Caveats are military limitations with major political connotations. In the analysis 
caveats are thus an integral part of the analysis in relation to both the direct military 
consequences of the limitations, and the indirect political rationales behind them and 
the political ramifications they create.  
In the next chapter the analysis now outlined is executed. 
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4 Analysis 
In this Chapter the analysis is conducted in the manner that was foreshadowed Chapter 
3. The aim is to unveil significant sings of unity and division in accordance to the 
political, organizational and military dimensions of NATO. 
The Chapter is divided in to four sub-chapters. Sub-chapter 4.1 deals with the time 
period 2001 - 2003 when NATO was not involved in the Afghan theatre. Then sub-
chapter 4.2 moves on to the time from 2003 to 2006 when NATO took command over 
ISAF. After this follows sub-chapter 4.3 which covers the period form 2006 - 2009 
when the insurgency was gaining momentum. And finally the sub-chapter 4.4 covers 
the Americanization of ISAF under Obama from 2009 to 2010. Each sub-chapter is 
concluded by a section that summarizes the main developments of the period in 
accordance with the three dimensions of unity and division. 
4.1 2001 - 2003 NATO Sidelined 
In a paradoxical twist of fate it was an attack on the US that led to the inaugural 
invocation of the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The September 11th 2001 
attack on the US was deemed an attack against all allies. The paradox of course being 
that when the Article 5 was crafted, now 61 years ago, the motivation was to ease the 
minds of European leaders and deter the Soviet ones, by reassuring the fact that in case 
of a new war emerging in Europe, the US would not fail to act as it did in both 1914 
and 1939. In 2001, however, it was not a conventional attack on Europe by a rival 
state, but a highly unconventional attack on the US by a non-state actor, that was to be 
the prelude to the historic inaugural invocation. Leaving these historical ironies aside, 
the fact remains that it was a terrorist attack on the US that led to Europe offering up 
its collective solidarity, and the invocation Article 5. The US, however, was not 
interested in what NATO was offering, and proceeded with the Alliance left on the 
sidelines. This paved that way for the extensive transformation efforts at the 2002 
Prague Summit. The period was at large, characterized by the politically unifying 
effects of the new paradigm of War on Terror, but NATO was in 2001 exposed as 
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organizationally and militarily divided across the Atlantic.     
4.1.1 Impetus for Change 
On the 11th of September 2001 the US and its European allies stood united in tragedy. 
Nearly three thousand people were killed in the attacks against New York and 
Washington. A prevailing sense of transatlantic brotherhood emerged in Europe and 
elsewhere as the dust settled on the streets of downtown Manhattan. Perhaps Le Monde 
captured the sentiment of the time best when it famously proclaimed “We are all 
Americans now”.  
NATO went through forty years of existential ideological struggle facing its 
counterpart the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. It then proceeded into the turbulent 
nineties searching for a purpose. The Alliance moved out of area and fired its first 
shots in Bosnia with Operation Deliberate Force in 1995, and conducted a highly 
controversial air bombing campaign on Belgrade under Operation Allied Force in 
1999. Nevertheless, despite its eventful history the Alliance had never before invoked 
its pillar commitment – the Article 5 solidarity. Needless to say this is an important 
turning point in the history of the transatlantic alliance and evidence of the greatly 
unifying effect created by the attacks on the political level. The Allies were 
unexpectedly united in horror and condemnation of the terrorist acts of 9/11. The 
unusual degree of emotion in the language of the Statement given by the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC) in an extraordinary assembly on the evening of September 
11th is palpable. The final words of the short statement read: 
At this critical moment, the United States can rely on its 18 Allies in North 
America and Europe for assistance and support. NATO solidarity remains the 
essence of our Alliance. Our message to the people of the United States is that 
we are with you. Our message to those who perpetrated these unspeakable 
crimes is equally clear: you will not get away with it.  
(NATO 2001) 
A strong sense of transatlantic unity was (re)created in common despise of the 
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atrocities of 9/11, and the following newborn sense of a uniting purpose led to the 
almost immediate invocation of the Article 5. In line with the expectations of realist 
theory 9/11 brought to the table internal cohesion and unity created by an external 
factor. The Article 5 invocation followed little more than 36 hours after the fall of the 
Twin Towers. It was passed with little debate and without any deliberation of what 
exactly such an invocation would entail. Although they did not oppose invocation, 
only the Dutch delegation raised the issue of the NAC needing to debate and clarify 
the implications of such a momentous act as the inaugural invocation. The Dutch 
proposal did however not gain much ground (Hallams 2010:58). This despite that fact 
that those familiar with the North Atlantic Treaty will know, namely that the famous 
Article 5 by no means is as absolute and an automatic deceleration of war, as is at 
times portrayed. On the contrary the Article was intentionally constructed with a 
certain degree of flexibility. The Article states that every ally shall individually or in 
concert undertake “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force” (NATO 1949). By implication the use of force is a very possible, however not 
inherently necessary consequence of invocation. Although the generality of the Article 
5 and the gravity of the situation called for clarifications to be made, the prevailing 
line of thought in the NAC was that this was not the time for such deliberations. The 
sense of urgency and need for immediate action was strong: “…there was a kin of tidal 
wave, this is not the time to ask that question now because we need to show we’re 
behind the US” (NATO official 2007, quoted in Hallams 2010:58). The September 
12th invocation was an act of solidarity and bears the hallmarks of an emotional gut 
response rather than a well considered strategic response. It is however a strong 
testament to a united transatlantic alliance. The US’s response, however, was not as the 
Europeans expected. 
Then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson revealed in a BCC interview that it 
was he who first raised the issue of Article 5 with the Americans in a phone call with 
Secretary of State Colin Powell. At this time Lord Robertson already had a draft 
statement ready. Lord Robertson further revealed that the initiative took Secretary 
Powell utterly by surprise, but after a 15 minute thinking break he called Lord 
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Robertson back and said “Yeah, this is of real interest” (BBC News 2002). This goes to 
show that although the US was foremost in the minds of NATO following 9/11, NATO 
was not foremost in the mind of the US. This led to an initial clash of perceptions as to 
NATO’s role in the coming War on Terror. 
Following their decision to invoke Article 5 the NATO allies decided to increase 
intelligence sharing, tighten security of US facilities on their soil, grant wide 
clearances of US and allied flights, and access to sea and airports. The most significant 
material NATO contribution, however, was the dispatching of five NATO AWACS 
(Airborne Warning and Control Systems) planes from their base in Germany to patrol 
the east coast of the US. These limited measures are symbolic of NATO’s, at best, 
indirect role in America’s War on Terror, and an indication of the transatlantic military 
divide of the time. 
On the 7th of October 2001 the US together with the UK launched the invasion of 
Afghanistan under the name Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Despite of the 
Article 5 invocation just under a month prior OEF was not a NATO operation. After 
the invasion OEF was to be, and is to this day, a counter-terrorist combat operation 
tasked to root out and destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaida.  
The capturing of Kabul and the outing of the Taliban from power was conducted at a 
formidable pace. This is in line with the prescriptions of the strategic dogma known as 
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which gained popularity in the US following 
the successful Gulf War of 1991. The coalition forces worked together with the local 
Northern Alliance, a group Afghans who never yielded to Taliban rule and held a small 
enclave of terrain in the northern most part of the country even at the high point of 
Taliban power, and captured Kabul within a mere two months. The campaign was truly 
a merger of extreme high-tech and low-tech components working in unison. The US 
forces utilizing Precision Guided Missiles and Night Vision Goggles, while the 
Northern Alliance rode on horses firing their trusted Kalashnikovs (Hammes 
2006:Chap.11).  
With Kabul under control an interim government led by Harmid Karzai was created at 
the Bonn conference of December 5th 2001. The interim government was also 
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sanctioned by the UNSC Resolution 1386, the same resolution that established ISAF, 
which was initially under British command. The command was to rotate between troop 
contributors every six moths, Turkey succeeded the British. The last to hold the post of 
ISAF command, before NATO stepped inn, was Germany and the Netherlands in a 
combined effort. ISAF was at the time limited to Kabul and mandated to “to assist the 
Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding 
areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United 
Nations can operate in a secure environment” (UNSC Res. 1386).   
Despite invoking Article 5 NATO played no role in Afghanistan at this time. The US 
had been taken by surprise by the historical invocation, and although they certainly 
appreciated the support and solidarity as a political gesture, it became clear that NATO 
did not play a lead part in the war plans laid out by the Bush White House and the 
Rumsfeld Department of Defense (DoD) (Hallams 2010:58). This is highly indicative 
of the underlying organizational and military capabilities division across the Atlantic 
that was brought to the surface by Afghanistan. The US had in OEF opted for an ad 
hoc coalition of the willing and able. Instead of utilizing NATO’s unique permanent 
command structure the US made it clear, through Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz’s appearance at the September 27th NATO Defence Ministers meeting, that 
they would only be seeking contributions from states willing to engage in operations 
under direct US command. The US managed to build a fairly large temporary alliance 
of the willing. By May 2002 the coalition consisted of 68 states and 20 states had 
deployed more than 16 000 troops to the US Central Command (US DoD 2002). The 
coalition included political support from all the allies, and 14 of the then 19 NATO 
states contributed with troops to the OEF, most notably the UK but with contributions 
from other key European allies such as Germany and France. This is a strong 
indication of that while 9/11 created transatlantic political unity, the organizational and 
military division that plagued the Alliance led to the “sharp end” of this political unity 
being expressed outside of NATO. 
France made both major naval and air force contributions to OEF. In course of the first 
year following the invasion France, as the only coalition country, contributed with 
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fighter aircrafts to the Manas base in Kirgizstan and provided close air support 
capability. France’s naval contribution to OEF was also significant and in fact 
accounted for approximately 24 percent of their entire naval force (US DoD 2002). 
As of May 2002 there were 2 560 German personnel operating within the OEF Central 
Command (CENTCOM) and German Special Operations Forces (SOF) were 
performing the full spectrum of SOF missions in Afghanistan. In addition to a naval 
contribution in terms of maritime patrol, Germany also submitted a battalion-sized 
Infantry Task Force operating in Kabul as part of ISAF which at this point in time was 
not a NATO operation (US DoD 2002). 
Major international players like the economic powerhouse that is Germany, and the 
French with their permanent seat on the UNSC and history of strong sovereignty and 
anti-American de Gaullism, contributed significantly to the US’s coalition of the 
willing. This in spite the of lack of political influence that is likely to wielded towards 
the US in an ad hoc coalition, in contrast to NATO where the US is bound institutional 
mechanisms, foremost of which is consensus as the decision rule on all levels. Even 
though the US’s unilateral reaction to 9/11 and NATO’s Article 5 invocation certainly 
displeased the European allies greatly5, the military contributions to the US’s War on 
Terror through OEF indicates that transatlantic political unity was dominant in the 
period following 9/11. Divisions were, however, revealed in relation to the 
organizational and military dimensions of NATO. This division, albeit present, was, 
however, far from devastating to transatlantic relations between the NATO allies. 
Although NATO as an organization was completely sidelined in Afghanistan from 
2001 to early 2003 the NATO members stood, at the time, strongly united on the 
political level in the War on Terror conducted in Afghanistan through OEF. NATO's 
problem, so to speak, was that due to the organizational and military transatlantic 
division the political unity was expressed though channels other than NATO. The main 
initial impact of the War on Terror in regard to the organizational and military 
                                                 
5
 Interviews conducted by Hallams (2010) reveal that a feeling of disappointment over the US's decision to 
circumvent NATO in invading Afghanistan following the Alliance’s was prominent among NATO officials  
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dimensions was the reinvigoration of NATO transformation towards the American 
perception of what NATO ought to be.    
The NATO members’ military contribution to the OEF is also an indication of that the 
much debated transatlantic “capabilities gap”, although a real and important factor in 
the US’s assessment of NATO, and a source of division in the transatlantic relations of 
the Alliance, is not an absolute divide. The decision to bypass NATO was also 
influenced by the ideologically founded neo-conservative unilateralism of the 
Rumsfeld DoD6, and the prevailing American view on the lesson learnt from the 
“committee war” of the Balkans in the late nineties, and not an unavoidable 
consequence of the transatlantic capabilities gap. The unilateralism of the US in opting 
for OEF before NATO was potentially a very dividing decision for the political 
dimension of the Alliance. The European contributions to OEF, however, illustrate that 
the unity created by the perceived threat of terrorism following 9/11 trumped the 
potential division inherent in sidelining NATO. The main consequence of the US 
decision to proceed in Afghanistan with the American commanded OEF and not 
NATO is that a wedge was driven between NATO as an organization and the 
battlefield where its most important member was fighting its purpose defining war. 
This lead to the realization in European capitals that NATO needed to change in order 
to stay relevant and thus produced political unity, not division as one might have 
expected.           
By bypassing the NATO command structure and thus the relentlessly demanding 
consensus building processes the US had gained complete operational and political 
control over their first decisive step into the War on Terror. Regardless of its accuracy 
the dominant US perception of NATO’s handling of the Balkan wars of the nineties is 
negative (Sperling and Webber 2009; Hallams 2010). This was due much to the fact 
that target selections in the 1999 air campaign on Belgrade had become such a highly 
politicized issue demanding of the US that they drag every selection through the slow 
gears of the consensus run machinery that is NATO. President Bush and Secretary 
Rumsfeld was not intent on another “war by committee”. However, everything comes 
                                                 
6
 For more neo-conservativism's influence on the Rumsfeld DoD  see Packer (2005) 
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at a price – including full operational and political control. In an ad hoc alliance of the 
willing, non but the leading nation is truly invested in the project. The reaming owe 
their allegiance not to the greater goal of the operation, such as fighting Al-Qaeda, but 
to their individual political aims, such as bettering relations with the US. In a 
permanent institutionalized alliance like NATO where every nation is involved in the 
decision making, every nation is also bound by a feeling of participation and 
ownership and thus committed towards implementation of these decisions by political 
prestige (Kay and Khan 2009:511).                     
In sum, the War on Terror initially created political unity and revealed Organizational 
and military division. This is demonstrated by the Article 5 invocation and the 
organizational and military transformation committed to by Europe at the Prague 
Summit in 2002. The years of NATO's non-existing role in Afghanistan and the 
European military contributions instead being channeled through OEF is a clear 
indicator of organizational and military transatlantic division and disharmony within 
NATO. The newly created transatlantic political unity was expressed almost solely 
outside of NATO – through OEF.  In the eyes of the US, NATO was not suited for the 
demands of the War on Terror. The realities of NATO's organization and military 
capabilities did not match the US's wish list. The political unity created was thus 
directed at bridging the transatlantic organizational and military division, rather than 
being directed directly onto the Afghan battlefield. This politically unity is manifested 
in the creation of the new Command Structure, the NATO Response Force and the 
Prague Capabilities Commitments in 2002. The notion that the US by 2001 was 
uninterested in NATO is completely undermined by the substantial aforementioned US 
initiated transformation efforts. On the contrary, reshaping NATO in the mold of the 
War on Terror was a central part of the paradigm from day one.  Furthermore, a central 
component of global force projection is access to military bases on foreign land. In this 
respect alliances and partnerships are crucial to the US security strategy. It became 
clear in 2001 that NATO had a distance to travel if it were to mend the transatlantic 
division in the military and organizational dimensions. The will demonstrated by 
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NATO to go the distance and undertake the needed transformation on the other hand 
further speak towards political unity. 
A monolithic analytical concept of NATO does not provide the opportunity for making 
the crucial distinction between the political, organizational and military dimensions of 
the matter, and thus fails to identify the counter working forces inherent in NATO’s 
transatlantic dynamic brought to bare in the analysis above. Rupp (2006:93) is a prime 
example of such a failure when he, in his analysis of NATO’s first year following 
9/11, argues that: “Instead of unifying and responding effectively to the new dangers in 
the system, the member states of NATO experienced their greatest sustained internal 
conflict since the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1949”. On the contrary, as the 
next sub-chapter shall reveal, the Prague Summit of spring 2002 was a display of 
transatlantic cooperation and unity through the allies seriously addressing the issues 
plaguing NATO and implementing strong measures to correct them. 
4.1.2 The NRF and the PCC – Driving Transformation 
Against the backdrop of the recent American led invasion of Afghanistan and the 
inaugural Article 5 invocation, the allies agreed on one of the most substantial 
structural revisions in the history of the Alliance at the 2002 Prague Summit. The 
present organizational structure of the Allied Command Operations (ACO) and the 
Allied Command Transformations (ACT) was established. Heading the ACT is the 
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT). The alliance now had a strategic 
commander at four-star General rank specifically and exclusively tasked with 
promoting transformation. From its creation in 2002 to 2009 the position was held by 
an American Officer which was double-hatted as chief of US Joint Forces Command, 
which is responsible for capabilities development for the US (NATO 2010b). This 
double-hatting is natural considering that one of the ACTs core tasks is ensuring 
transatlantic interoperability and bringing European military capabilities closer to the 
American standard. It is also indicative of how it is the US that is the main proponent 
of NATO transformation, also under the Paradigm of War on Terror, and strongly 
undermines the notion of the US being disinterested in NATO. In 2009 the SACT 
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position was left to a French General Stéphane Abrial as part of France fully rejoining 
the NATO command structure.  
Furthermore, the allies at Prague came together in embrace of a number of specific 
instruments and requirements known as the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). 
This was an expression of political unity, in order to mend the existing organizational 
transatlantic divisions. The new structure is to a large extent a tool for shaping NATO 
in the image of the US. As the 1999 OAF campaign on Belgrade had made abundantly 
clear the transatlantic military capability gap was a very real challenge for the 
Alliance. In the OAF the US contributed with 83 percent of the total number of 
weapons delivered and 66 percent of the total number of aircrafts involved. It also 
conducted more than 90 percent of the air-to-air refueling, as well as all tactical 
jamming capabilities, and contributed the majority of airlift capabilities (Perets et al. 
2001:230-234, Lambeth 2001:64 & Hallams 2010:48). Although Europe delivered the 
majority of troops to KFOR in the aftermath of OAF, these peacekeepers operated in a 
relatively secure environment and this does not change the fact that a transatlantic 
capabilities gap for advanced operations existed. Williams (2008:69) quotes one 
anonymous US Official stating that “when the European forces are so incapable and 
the European governments are so restrictive …the stronger argument is for those who 
want to go it alone”. At the turn of the millennium only Britain and France of the 
European allies could muster a substantial number of expeditionary forces ready to be 
deployed at strategic distances from their homeland. The American security 
neighborhood is, as it was then, a global one, and global force projection is thus the 
cornerstone of American military planning and strategy. The NSS of 2002 reads “The 
war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration” it 
goes on to state that “The United States will build on these common interests to 
promote global security”.   
The 2004 NSS of underlines the importance of force projection:  
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 Enhancing the US overseas presence and footprint must improve the ability of 
 regional forces to employ an expeditionary  approach in response to regional 
 and global contingencies. 
Multilateralism has since the end of Cold War grown in importance in terms of 
building political legitimacy for military action (Matlary 2006). It was therefore in the 
vital interest of the US, that the European allies are able to provide the kind of forces 
and capabilities that fit in to the American paradigm of war for the 21st century. That 
is highly mobile expeditionary forces deployable at extremely short notice in response 
of a sudden change in the security picture, such as a terrorist attack. As then Secretary 
of Defence Donald Rumsfeld argued at the NATO Defence Ministers meeting in 
Warsaw months before the Prague Summit “If NATO does not have a force that is 
quick and agile, which can deploy in days or weeks instead of months or years, then it 
will not have much to offer the world in the twenty-first century” (BCC News World 
Edition 2002). The allies took the Secretary at his word and at the Prague summit they 
decided to create the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF was to be the 
locomotive crafted to drive the much sought after military modernization of NATO-
Europe. The Prague Summit Declaration declared that the NRF was to be a:  
 ...technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable 
 force including land, sea and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever 
 needed… the NRF will also be a catalyst for focusing and promoting 
 improvements in the Alliance’s military capabilities  
          (NATO 2002)  
The NRF was from the very start an ambitious military project to say the least. The 
envisioned quick and agile response force fits perfectly into the US military paradigm 
on how to win the War on Terror. The 2004 US National Military Strategy underlines 
the importance of strategic agility, which it defines as the ability to rapidly deploy, 
employ, sustain and redeploy forces to all regions in response to crisis. The NRF was 
to be NATO’s part in this vision. As Binnendijk and Kruger (2002:118), the American 
architects behind the original draft created for the NRF in early 2002, write on their 
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vision for the forthcoming spearhead force guiding transformation: “a real force 
maintained at high readiness, capable of swiftly projecting power to distant areas 
outside Europe and then conducting demanding combat operations with US forces in 
wide spectrum of contingencies”. Note the phrase “outside Europe”, the out-of-area 
debate of the nineties concerned the Balkans and other parts of Europe outside of 
NATO. By 2002 the Alliance had decided to prepare to go a significant leap further 
and step outside of Europe itself. This is an indication of the new politically unifying 
aftermath of 9/11. 
This development is a direct consequence of the initial political unity created by the 
War on Terror. The Cold War notion of protecting the homeland lingered in most 
European capitals throughout the nineties and shaped their traditional image of 
Europe’s role in NATO and thus hampered any real transformation and modernization 
away from static and immobile national defence such as the failed DCI of 1999. While 
it is true that the early nineties marked the high point of UN interventionism and the 
decade saw NATO engage in two conflicts in the Balkans, military transformation in 
NATO-Europe was in fact limited. While European armies, air forces and navies 
contain smaller units of excellent quality they, with some exceptions, lacked the ability 
to project this power to far off regions such as Central-Asia. Furthermore, there existed 
a lack of ability to run larger integrated operations independently. NATO-Europe was 
“dependent upon the United States, and… limited to contributing at the margins” 
(Binnendijk and Kruger 2002). When the US and the UK in October of 2001 launched 
a major military invasion directly affecting European security without the continental 
Europe playing a serious military role it marked a watershed. NATO-Europe realized 
that further relevance and influence in NATO warranted significant change on their 
part. This explains the political unity expressed at the Prague Summit in 2002 in spite 
of the organizational and military transatlantic division of the time.  
Moreover, in addition to military capability development there was a more indirect and 
political equally important side to the PCC and the NRF. As Ringsmose (2009:288) 
writes:  
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At its core the NRF initiative was conceived as a means to furnish the Atlantic 
Alliance with an agile and robust military tool, while at the same time inducing 
an expeditionary mind-set among the European allies. The two main tenets 
underpinning the construct was thus to craft a state-of-the-art multinational 
force and to generate military transformation “a la Americano”. On the 
political level, the major rationale behind the NRF was to strengthen the 
transatlantic link at a time of crisis. 
Strengthening the transatlantic bond was always at the heart of the matter for the NRF. 
The nineties had left NATO-Europe deflated as it became apparent the European allies 
were not even able to ensure the peace and stability of their own continent. Greatly 
adding to the European frustrations at the time of the conception of the NRF was the 
fact that NATO was left on the sidelines in the invasion of Afghanistan. In 2001 the 
transatlantic capabilities gap had once again become a dividing issue in transatlantic 
relations. A 2007 report for the US Congress sums up the American position quite 
concisely: “The aftermath of September 11th further highlighted allied military 
limitations vis-à-vis the United Sates” (CRS Report 2007). Consensus based NATO 
has always been Europe’s best way to restrain the world’s only superpower. NATO 
has at the same time always been the US’s best way of ensuring a friendly, stable and 
democratic Europe (more or less) able and willing to contribute in realizing American 
national interests. European capitals recognized that something needed to be done if 
this fruitful relationship was to be kept alive. American unilateralist rhetoric was under 
the first Bush Administration at a highpoint and collations of the willing were 
operating in Afghanistan and preparing for Iraq. Given the unifying effects of this joint 
transatlantic interest of keeping NATO relevant, the willingness to change in 
accordance with American demands was present in NATO-Europe at Prague 2002. 
The political climate within NATO at the NRF’s inception in 2002 was quite 
favorable. The abrupt changes brought about by 9/11 and the subsequent War on 
Terror was at this time wielding a politically unifying effect upon the Alliance that was 
not present before the terrorist attacks of 2001. This becomes apparent if one compares 
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the level of transatlantic commitment brought to bare in the PCC as opposed to the 
Defence Capabilities Initaiative of 1999. 
At the 1999 Washington 50th anniversary summit held as operations in the former 
Yugoslavia were still ongoing, the then 19 allies came to a consensus on a program for 
defence modernization of Europe – the DCI. As previously discussed the second 
Balkan war was the prelude to alliance concerns over a capability gap dividing the 
allies across the Atlantic. A disproportionate amount of fighter sorties were conducted 
by the US. The lack of interoperability of the European and American forces was a 
real issue, virtually forming a dark cloud over the Washington summit which strived to 
present a unified NATO embarking on its very first post Cold War enlargement and 
presenting its new Strategic Concept. 
The DCI lists 59 specific measurements to reach the goal of increased interoperability 
and military transformation of NATO-Europe. The list of items was divided into five 
subsets: mobility and deployability, sustainability and logistics, effective engagement, 
survivability and consultation, command and control (Boland 1999). However, as a 
subsequent US Congressional report reveals – the allies did not deliver on their 
promise: “Before long… …analysts realized that DCI was not meeting its goals 
because the changes that had been agreed to required most countries to increase their 
defence spending. Most, however, did not.” (CRS Report 2007).   
The PCC of 2002 differ in a number of ways from its predecessor. Four central 
differences are the PCC: a) focuses on a lesser number of goals, b) emphasizes 
multinational cooperation and specialization c) requires specific commitments from 
member states, and d) was designed with a particular force in mind (the NRF) (CRS 
Report 2007). Where the DCI was divided into five general subsets, the PCC contains 
eight specific areas of improvement: i) chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
defence, ii) intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition, iii) air-to-ground 
surveillance, iv) command control and communications, v) combat effectiveness, vi) 
strategic air and sea lift, vii) air to air refueling and viii) deployable combat support 
and combat service support units. Furthermore, the PCC lays the ground for increased 
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pooling of funds and multinational efforts to a larger degree than the DCI (CRS Report 
2007).  
As the then NATO Assitant Secertary General for Defence and Planning Operations 
Edgar Buckley so eloquently put it in a 2002 interview when speaking of the 
differences between the DCI and the PCC: “… if everybody agrees to do everything 
that means nobody agrees to anything. This time around we know who’s agreed to do 
what, and we will monitor their implementation of their commitments” (NATO 
Published Interview 2002). While the DCI was to compel all allies to fulfill all 58 
requirements, the PCC specifies which member will do what from the very outset; thus 
avoiding the problem of disintegration of responsibility and the subsequent free riding 
that hindered the realization of the DCI.  The PCC includes a system for keeping track 
of compliance through the commitment of all member states to report on their progress 
to the international staff at NATO HQ on a regular basis. The stronger and more 
comprehensive transatlantic commitment of the PCC is evidence of the initial 
politically unifying effect of the War on Terror.   
4.1.3 Three Dimensions of Unity and Division 
In sum, the period of 2001 - 2003 saw NATO rush into the historic inaugural 
invocation of Article 5 in an expression of the strongly unifying effect of 9/11 in 
regard to the political dimension, compared to before the War on Terror. This political 
unity was, however, in military terms expressed outside of NATO through OEF.  As to 
the organizational dimension of the Alliance, the the sidelining of NATO in 
Afghanistan was highly indicative of the NATO of 2001's lacking operational 
suitability and need for transformation in the eyes of the US. As a result NATO's 
Command Structure was completely rearranged to American preferences and the NRF 
was created in 2002. In 2001 the same dividing transatlantic dynamic was present in 
regard to the military dimension as it was with the organizational one The forces the 
European allies could muster were to a large extent not suited to American needs. The 
circumstances were similar to the division caused by the transatlantic capabilities gap 
during the 1999 OAF campaign. The European resolve to mend these divisions were, 
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however, significantly greater in the period 2001 - 2003 than in 1999 - 2001. This is 
evident in comparing the level of commitment behind the DCI and the PCC. 
As I shall explore in the next chapters, the political unity of the 2001 - 2003 period 
was to be severely challenged by the increasing demands of the ISAF operation. I also 
further investigate Afghanistan’s impact on NATO's organizational dimension through 
the NRF, and the military dimension by the development of the PCC. 
4.2 2003 - 2006 The Burden of Responsibility 
The period of 2003 to 2006 saw the US War on Terror expand to include Iraq and 
NATO’s role was greatly expanded in Afghanistan, both of which created significant 
transatlantic consequences. A clash of  perceptions between the US and much of 
Europe was revealed by Iraq, and the new responsibilities placed upon the Alliance 
through ISAF expansion led to increased divisions within the Alliance. 
4.2.1 Clashing Perceptions 
By 2002 the US had started to move its focus to Iraq and was eager for Europe to bear 
more of the burden in Afghanistan where the main fighting was considered to be over 
and done with.  
The subject of this thesis is transatlantic relations within NATO illuminated through 
the case of the Afghan War. However, the Afghan War is but one out of a manifold set 
of independent variables that have affected my chosen dependent variable over the 
course of the last nine years in which my analysis span. None so more profoundly than 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq which shook transatlantic relations across the board of 
institutions and issue areas including NATO. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan can not 
be treated in isolation from one and other as they interact and together formed the most 
pressing issues in international security relations for both NATO and the US.  
From the American point of view in 2002 Afghanistan was merely the first move in 
the new paradigm of War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq and the toppling of 
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Saddam Hussein was the logical next step after Afghanistan. Vice President Cheney 
speaking to a crowd of veterans assured the listeners that:  
 The Taliban has already learned that lesson, but Afghanistan was only the 
 beginning of a lengthy campaign. Were we to stop now, any sense of security 
 we might have would be false and temporary 
         (Cheney Speech 2002) 
The focus of the Vice Presidents speech was not, as one might have expected less that 
a year after the launch of OEF, on Afghanistan. The main emphasis of the speech was 
on building a normative argument based in the virtues of democracy and freedom 
towards war against Iraq. A normative position of spreading liberty by way of the gun, 
that is at the core of the neo-conservative ideology (Packer 2005:Chap.2). To once 
again quote the Vice President:  
We would act in that same spirit after a regime change in Iraq. With our help, a 
liberated Iraq can be a great nation once again. Iraq is rich in natural 
resources and human talent, and has unlimited potential for a peaceful, 
prosperous future. Our goal would be an Iraq that has territorial integrity, a 
government that is democratic and pluralistic, a nation where the human rights 
of every ethnic and religious group are recognized and protected. In that 
troubled land all who seek justice, and dignity, and the chance to live their own 
lives, can know they have a friend and ally in the United States of America 
(Cheney Speech 2002) 
Observe that the Vice President is using the same normatively based argumentation 
when speaking of Afghanistan: 
Today in Afghanistan, the world is seeing that America acts not to conquer but 
to liberate, and remains in friendship to help the people build a future of 
stability, self-determination, and peace  
(Cheney Speech 2002) 
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President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address has since become remembered as 
the speech where the President listed the “axis of evil” made up by North Korea, Iran 
and Iraq. The War on Terror was not confined to Afghanistan. As President Bush 
(2002) unambiguously declared in the address: “Our war on terror is well begun, but it 
is only begun”. 
Understanding that Afghanistan and Iraq, to the US, both were part of the highly 
normative ideologically driven paradigm of the War on Terror is essential in 
examining NATO and Afghanistan. The reason this is essential is because this 
paradigm is not shared by the European allies, and this divergence in world view is 
one of the main sources of the emerging strain on the transatlantic relations within 
NATO after 2003. As explored in the previous sub-chapter, following the 9\11 attacks 
on the US the European leaders stood politically united with the US and ready to assist 
in what they perceived to be a just invasion of Taliban Afghanistan. To such an extent, 
even, that their commitment did not weaver despite the fact that the US opted to 
circumvent NATO and command the operation unilaterally. In fact German 
Chancellor Schröder of the Social Democratic Party went as far as making the 
question of Germany contributing troops to OEF in the fall of 2001 a vote of 
confidence for his government in the Bundestag. The link between Al-Qaida and the 
Taliban was real and proven, and so was Europe's support for the Afghan engagement 
at the time. The link between 9\11, terrorism, Al-Qaeda and regime change in Iraq, 
however, was anything but clear to the western European Allies. This is the main 
reason why Iraq was a politically dividing issue while Afghanistan had a unifying 
effect. In Western European NATO capitals Afghanistan and Iraq were two 
completely separate issues. With the highly significant exception of the UK there was 
little to no support for war with Iraq to be found in Western Europe. Chancellor 
Schröder of Germany and President Chirac of France were particularity strong in their 
opposition. 
Many when speaking or writing on the 2003 “crisis” in US - European relations tend 
to forget that Europe in NATO is not what it once was. Pond (2004:ix) for instance 
claims, with regards to NATO, that: “relations in the transatlantic community … were 
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in greater crisis in 2003 than ever before”. Gordon (2003:1) writes that: “ ...whether 
or not invade Iraq has provoked one of the worst transatlantic crisis … of the entire 
post-World War II period”. What these claims fail to recognize is that transatlantic 
relations in NATO is no longer strictly the domain of Western Europe. One does well 
not forget what then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld coined to be the New 
Europe. When confronted with what was dubbed by journalists as European resistance 
towards war in Iraq Secretary Rumsfeld replied “You're thinking of Europe as 
Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe” (Applebaum 2003). All three 
of NATO's newest members the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, supported and 
contributed troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), with Poland making a highly 
significant contribution of 2,500 troops on the ground. Of the eight future member 
countries that at the time took part in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), six, namely 
Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia, contributed and supported 
OIF, the two remaining being Slovenia and Croatia. The 2003 brawl over Iraq is in 
reality more precisely labeled as an inter-European issue with Atlantic dimensions, 
rather than simply a transatlantic divide. Nor was it a strict east-Europe versus west-
Europe scenario in addition to Britain, Spain, Denmark and Italy also supported and 
contributed to the invasion of Iraq.   
Putting the above mentioned exceptions aside, opposition to an invasion of Iraq was 
deep seated both in the elites and the peoples of Western Europe and as the US's 
efforts to mount transatlantic support for the endeavor proceed through 2002 what they 
achieved was the direct opposite – tensions grew rapidly and the transatlantic 
relationship was weakened. French and German opposition was exceptionally vocal 
and the French with their permanent seat excluded any possibility of the much sought 
after United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate for the War. Even though the 
Bush-Administration had already made their decision they continuously through 2002 
pushed for international support in the UNSC. This is because a UNSC mandate 
carries an overwhelming amount of legitimacy in the European audience, and would 
probably have gone a long way in muting European public opposition. Opinion polls 
from September 2002 reveal that as much as 60 percent of the European public backed 
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invasion given that it held UN approval and support of allies (Rupp 2006:124). The 
UNSC's role as the sole provider of legal grounds for international military force has 
made its mandate a sina qua none for military intervention in the post-modern Europe. 
That being said, even though a UN mandate goes a long way in remedying it, Western 
Europe carries an aversion towards the use of military force which is not found in the 
US. This can amply be illustrated by answers given in opinion polls revealing striking 
transatlantic differences in opinion towards war.  The Western European NATO states 
are characterized by a post-modern attitude where military might is seen as something 
very alien and “of the past”, which almost by definition is wrong. While 74 percent of 
Americans answered yes to a question of whether: “war might be necessary in some 
cases”, the percent of Europeans answering positively to the same question was as low 
as 32 percent, and in key state Germany as low as 25 percent (Matlary 2009:152). The 
post-modern pacifism is most prominent in the former fascist states of Germany and 
Italy. As Matlary (2009:148) puts it “Post-modern publics do not accept the 
characteristics of the military tool any longer”.  
The 9/11 attacks created a sense of imminent threat in the US legitimating the rhetoric 
of Global War on Terror and the in turn legitimizing war measures such as preemptive 
invasion of Iraq. The same can not be said of Europe. These fundamental transatlantic 
differences. Firstly, the differing understanding and conceptualization of the War on 
Terror, and secondly, the general perception of the legitimacy of military might and 
the role of the UNSC, contributed to increased transatlantic political division in the 
time frame of 2003 to 2006. 
4.2.2 Disproportionate Burden-Sharing 
On April 11th 2003 NATO accepted per request of the UNSC to take command over 
the ISAF mission7. In a historical perspective this is an unprecedented and highly 
unexpected turn in NATO history. In 2003 NATO’s members accepted without 
                                                 
7
 Twelve UNSC resolutions pertain to ISAF namely: 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1817, 
1833, 1890 and 1917 (of March 2010).  
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dissident or much debate a major military undertaking far outside of Europe. Granted 
that the challenges of stabilizing Afghanistan were greatly underestimated at the time, 
and the allies were not aware of the true nature of the issue facing them. In the words 
of the commander of ISAF in 2006 General Richards (2006:11): “The North Atlantic 
Council agreed the plan for NATO expansion in Afghanistan on the assumption that 
the environment would become … increasingly benign”. Today we of course know the 
opposite was to be the case. Despite this, it is still a momentous turn in NATO history. 
No more than four years earlier the European allies had dismissed any notion that the 
Alliance’s new Strategic Concept of 1999 should mandate military action outside of 
Europe (Sloan 2010:36). “Out-of-area” at that time was outside of NATO, but still well 
within Europe.          
ISAF consists of troops from all the NATO allies and a great number of partner 
countries making the total number of contributing states forty-seven. States as diverse 
as Mongolia, Azerbaijan and Singapore take part in the coalition. Major non-member 
contributors are among others Australia, Sweden and Georgia. ISAF’s mission in 
Afghanistan is divided into five phases. 
The first phase was i) assessment and preparation this phase was completed while the 
force was stationed in Kabul and under unilateral commands in 2001 to 2003. The next 
phase was ii) geographical expansion after which followed iii) stabilization which is 
the current phase8. Phase iv) is transition in which the ANA and ANP are to assume 
full security responsibilities, and finally there is phase v) redeployment. Since early 
2009 NATO and US Officials have reportedly debated when to announce the start of 
the transition phase (CRS Report 2009a). This chapter analyzes the phase of 
expansion between 2003 and 2006.        
As early as with the Bonn Agreement it was envisioned that ISAF would expand 
beyond Kabul. “Such a force [ISAF] could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded 
to other urban centers and other areas” (Bonn Agreement 2001). ISAF expansion 
took place in four stages between 2003 and 2006. 
                                                 
8
 At the 2010 Lisbon Summit it was decided that phase iv) would commence in the summer of 2011  
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Table 2: ISAF Expansion 
(ISAF 2006) 
Stage 1 of expansion started of by ISAF assuming control over the until then German 
led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz in December 2003. This was a 
pilot project and four more new PRTs were soon to follow suit. The stage was 
completed by October the following year when all nine northern provinces of 
Afghanistan were under auspices of ISAF. Stage 2 started in February 2005 moved 
ISAF into the Western parts of the Country. The pashton dominated south has always 
been the Taliban's heartland. They originated from the southern Kandahar province, 
and the south is where they enjoy the highest degree of popular support. NATO and 
ISAF's expansion into the perilous south was delayed numerous times as violence was 
high in the region and NATO struggled to achieve the necessary pledges of troops 
from its members (CRS Report 2009a:5). This is indicative of the negative change in 
political unity that developed in the period of expansion, when compared to the time of 
2001 - 2003. In July 2006 it was finally implemented. With Stage 3 the number of 
ISAF troops in the country doubled from 10 000 to 20 000 (NATO Topics: 
Afghanistan, 2010). 
Since the very beginning of ISAF operations, and to this day, the Alliance members 
have placed national caveats upon the use of their national troops. Caveats are detailed 
48 
 
restrictions prescribing what a nation’s soldiers can and cannot do, on the ground in 
Afghanistan. The exact number and many of the details surrounding ISAF caveats are 
classified information. The number and nature of the caveats change over time, 
however, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General James 
Jones has reveled that there was something in the order of fifty to eighty caveats 
restraining the priorities of NATO's command in Afghanistan in 2006. Examples of 
which are restrictions on not deploying troops to the more perilous south, not to 
operate at night and what weapons not to use (Auerswald & Saideman 2009:2). In 
addition to these written official caveats there exists a swarm of unwritten and 
sometimes unspoken national limitations. There is a constant dialogue between 
Afghanistan and the NATO-capitals, and decision makers on the ground consult their 
superiors in their home capitals when in doubt (Thruelsen 2007). This of course is 
bringing politics into military tactics in a way that profoundly breaks with the classic 
separation of civilian and political affairs that Huntington (1957) prescribes. ISAF is in 
effect being partially micromanaged form a number of separate European capitals. 
Furthermore, the ad hoc nature of the unwritten caveats seriously hinders the planning 
of operations on the ground. ISAF commanders are faced with uncertainty and sudden 
changes in regards to not only who can do what, but when they can do it, where they 
can do it, and even how they are to do it. These are no conditions for proper military 
planning.    
As ISAF’s mission expanded geographically between 2003 and 2006 the problem of 
national caveats became an increasingly pressing issue. As ISAF’s area of 
responsibility grew geographically, so did the spectrum of operations required of the 
force. In 2005, preceding its final expansion and the move in to the perilous south, the 
ISAF Rules of Engagement (ROE) were modified and expanded. Despite this the 
ISAF ROE still remained fairly limited. Adding to the issue were the constraints 
imposed by the manifold and detailed national caveats placed upon troops. There 
exists a considerable amount of ill will in parts of the continental Europe towards 
committing troops to engage the Taliban and other anti government forces in head-on 
combat. As Kay and Khan (2007:170) writes on the 2005 modification: “To expand 
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the mission to include COIN combat operations was more than the consensus process 
in NATO could handle”. There seems to have been an unspoken underlying premise in 
the transatlantic relationship within the alliance that only those that volunteer forces to 
the US led OEF were signing up for combat operations. Those who remained under 
NATO’s command and ISAF were exempt from these high risk operations. However, 
since 2006 when ISAF’s mandate was expanded to include the entire country ISAF 
has to an increasing degree taken on high-risk operations. But as ISAF slowly 
progressed into a COIN operation and the death tolls have risen, the caveats have 
become more and more of a dividing issue. Caveats are expressions of political 
division as they are manifestations of national interests trumping strategic priorities. 
The caveats minimize the risk of combat-death for the national contingent in question 
at the direct expense of the troops of other fellow allies. In Afghanistan British, 
Canadian and American forces account for 84 percent of the 1 078 combat-deaths 
between 2001 and 2009 (Sperling and Webber 2009:508) Caveats are in this sense an 
instrument of intra-alliance burden shifting. 
The difficulties of stabilizing Afghanistan were, despite the country’s history, grossly 
underestimated by both NATO and the US for many years. Much needed change of 
strategy did not emerge until 2009. The initial and continued separation of ISAF and 
OEF has been an impediment to NATO and the US achieving their aims in 
Afghanistan. The two forces operate under different mandates and with separate Rules 
of Engagement. This allowed those allies, like the British, who were willing to 
contribute combat troops to the more dangerous offensive operations of OEF to do so, 
but perhaps as importantly; it created an opportunity for the more reluctant European 
allies, like Germany, to limit their troops to the softer nation building force of ISAF. A 
contribution which proved far easier to sell to their home public that the more 
aggressive OEF. However, as the war has evolved the two forces have grown to look 
more and more alike. Only French and German steadfast reluctance in 2004 stopped a 
US proposal to merge the two operations under unified NATO command (Kay & 
Khan 2007). Some progress has been made in unifying command. While initially 
separate today the forces are under joint command as the head of ISAF and the head of 
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OEF is a double-hatted position, currently held by General Petreaus. For (at least) the 
three first years of NATO involvement leading up to 2006 much of NATO-Europe9 
believed it could get trough Afghanistan without getting their hands dirty or make any 
real sacrifices. ISAF was to play the “good cop”, and the US through OEF was to be 
the “bad cop”. As time and the mounting insurgency progressed, however, it became 
clear that unlike in the Balkans there was no peace to be “kept” in Afghanistan.   
The exposure to the more dangerous regions of Afghanistan might have led to certain 
relaxations in the number and extent of national caveats as ISAF contributing nations 
realized that this was what was needed to meet the challenges now ahead (Richards 
2006, Auerswald & Saideman 2009, CRS Report 2009b:16)). British General David 
Richards10 described the situation in the summer of 2006 as “The last few months have 
witnessed milestones in the development of multinational coherence and unity of 
effort… …the removal of customary restrictions by nations for recent operations, such 
as Operation Turtle… …are all examples of how NATO is transforming on the job in 
Afghanistan.” (Richards 2006:10). Operation Turtle was a combat maneuver 
conducted in the west of Afghanistan in 2006 in support of an OEF operation. It marks 
the change in the spectrum of ISAF operations that was taking place at the time and 
where to evolve much further as time progressed and the Afghan insurgency gained 
momentum. General Richards (2006:14) is once again very optimistic when he 
describes the operation as “a microcosm of many of the aims of transformation and of 
new NATO emerging from the constraints of the old”. 
There are substantial grounds, however, for a more somber take on the development. 
In fact that when NATO was tasked with expanding ISAF to include the south in 2006 
it was in fact not NATO, as one, that rose to the challenge. In fact only Australia (non-
member), Canada, Denmark, Estonia, the Netherlands, Romania and the UK (in 
addition to the US) deployed troops to the south. That is eight of forty-seven 
                                                 
9Notable exceptions are: the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands 
 
10Commander of ISAF from 2006 to 2007 
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contributing nations, and even more telling – only seven of the then twenty-six NATO 
allies. The majority of other allies do not even allow their troops to travel to Helmand 
of Kandahar. Thruelsen (2007:21) illustrates the point precisely by the hampered 
execution of Operation Medusa of September 2006. The operation was led by ISAF 
Regional Command South (RC-S) and to be conducted in the province of Kandahar. 
RC-S realized that they would be needing additional assistance from other regions in 
order to conduct the mission. Specifically Civilian Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and 
Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) capabilities were requested. A request was sent 
to ISAF HQ for provision of the needed capabilities. However, the operation Medusa 
was forced to proceed without the requested capabilities. NATO HQ had identified 
and requested that a French CIMIC unit had joined the Operation Medusa in 
Kandahar. Paris, however, had placed its troops under strict orders not to engage in the 
south. The French soldiers were not allowed to leave the relative security of Kabul and 
Regional Command Center. This is but a single of a seemingly endless list of instances 
where caveats has stood between ISAF commanders and the operational flexibility the 
mission requires. 
In addition to hindering the realization of NATO's cause in Afghanistan on the military 
level, the caveats also have a potent political dimension. Unfair and uneven sharing of 
risk  is dividing the allies. The alternative explanation of the ISAF acronym heard 
among US soldiers “I Saw Americans Fight” speaks to the common perception of not 
all allies carrying their appropriate share of the burden. More than any other the 
German ISAF contribution has been the subject of much debate and criticism. German 
troops in Afghanistan were bound by very extensive caveats and in the first years they 
were hardly allowed to move outside of their camps at all (CRS Report 2009b:16). The 
PRT of Feyzabad in northern Afghanistan consisted of German, Danish and Czech 
troops. Although, the Danish contribution only accounted for 41 out of about 400 
soldiers at the base, the Danish who opposed to the Germans are limited by few to no 
caveats, were having to do more than fifty percent of all patrolling (Thruelsen 
2007:14). Such massive disproportionate burden sharing is bound to affect the 
relationship between even the best of allies. To once again utilize the case of the 
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Danish and the Germans as they perfectly serve to illustrate the differences. Denmark's 
troop contribution consists of about seven hundred troops who have been located in 
the southern Afghanistan region of Helmand since 2006. Germany is the third largest 
contributor of troops to ISAF with contributions varying between four to five thousand 
troops located mainly to Kabul and the Northern provinces. However, to this day 
Denmark has suffered thirty-eight deaths, while Germany has lost forty-seven of its 
citizens (including three policemen) in Afghanistan. Relative to the size of the 
respective countries population, and thus the size of their contributions, Denmark has 
undoubtedly carried the significantly heavier burden of the two. Calculated as fatalities 
per million inhabitants the figure for Denmark is 5,64 and for Germany its 0,51. If 
calculated by fatalities per troops deployed the numbers are 4,13 for Denmark, and 
0.90 for Germany (Ringsmose 2010:334). 
Caveats, especially the restrictions on traveling south, are the main impediments to 
achieving the operational flexibility that the American strategic and tactical documents 
earlier presented speak so highly of. The realization that the number of troops needed 
in Afghanistan had been severely underestimated for years, today has dawned upon 
NATO and the US. “Since 2005, this mission [ISAF] moved to a counter insurgency 
focus, which was not adequately resourced until 2009” (ISAF 2010a). As NATO 
information officer for Afghanistan Mr. Riggio puts it when he speaks of ISAF before 
2009 “There has been a mismatch between a very ambitious end sate… and the 
amount of resources devoted to this end state” (Hurriet Daily News 2010). The 
national caveats have undoubtedly contributed to this mismatch by effectively 
decreasing the number of troops that ISAF commanders can actually utilize where they 
are most needed.  
As of 2010 there are twenty-seven PRT's in Afghanistan there presence presides 
NATO's involvement as they earliest ones were established already in 2001. Each PRT 
is under a national command and they differ greatly in the execution of their mandate. 
As with the caveats the PRTs suffer from national priorities trumping strategic 
concerns. The aim of the PRTs is to facilitate civilian-military cooperation and through 
this foster stability, development and governance in their region. The efforts of the 
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various PRTs are not coordinated at ISAF HQ or anywhere else for that matter. The 
Turkish PRT in Wardak, for instance, is led by a civilian and has a distinctly non-
military profile while the Norwegian PRT in Meymaneh is a strictly military base. 
This is symptomatic of the disunity of efforts by NATO in Afghanistan. There is little 
or no formal exchange of experiences and separate efforts are left disjointed (Sloan 
2010). The PRTs are cornerstones of the Comprehensive Approach combining 
security, development and governance through civil-military cooperation. The lack of 
ISAF-level coordination and a consistent strategy of managing these key pieces of the 
puzzle is therefore holding NATO back in Afghanistan.  
4.2.3 Three Dimensions of Unity and Division 
In sum, the expansion period between 2003 and 2006 was a time of increasing political 
division when compared to the preceding periods. The expansion of the War on Terror 
to include the invasion of Iraq wielded a strongly dividing effect upon the political 
dimension of the alliance as it revealed great transatlantic differences of 
understanding. Moreover, the ISAF expansion and the following increased combat 
activity made it apparent through, among other factors, the national caveats, that many 
of the European allies were letting national interest trump the common good. This is a 
sign of that the political unity found in 2001 - 2003 was significantly reduced. In the 
period 2003 - 2006 NATO's new Command Structure was brought into the American 
War on Terror through taking charge of ISAF. This is a significant development in 
regard to the organizational dimension, and a sign of lessening organizational 
transatlantic division. As to the military dimension, the allies were now, as opposed to 
the preceding period, engaged in common operations under NATO command. All 
twenty-six allies contributing to a multinational force such as ISAF wielded positive 
unifying effect on military unity and interoperability in the period. However, the 
politically imposed limitations and the disunity of command that marked NATO's 
engagement not only hindered immediate operational flexibility, but just as 
importantly it hampered the potential long term gains made in transatlantic 
interoperability and cooperation. These gains would likely have created a significant 
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unifying effect as to the military dimension. The national caveats were a dividing 
factor both in regard to the political and the militarily dimensions.  
The Allies once again at the 2004 Istanbul re-committed to the transformation process 
started at the Prague Summit two years earlier. The Summit Statement reads “the 
implementation of national Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) is progressing, 
and multinational activities – in strategic sealift and airlift, air-to-air refuelling” 
(NATO 2004a). The efforts to improve the essential common air-lift capabilities taken 
at Istanbul came to fruition in July 2009. Three aircrafts with strategic air-lift 
capabilities, based in Hungary and multinational staffed, then became operational. 
These aircrafts were multilaterally acquired through NATO by ten allied and two 
partner countries. The capability has been utilized in supporting ISAF among other 
operations (NATO 2010d). This is a strong indicator of that, while political tensions 
over the lack of burden-sharing in ISAF rose throughout the period, important long-
term steps were taken to bridge the transatlantic divide in regards to the military 
dimension. Then Secretary General Scheffer remarked “At Istanbul, we …moved our 
military transformation another major step forward” (NATO 2004b). 
The next sub-chapter examines further the transatlantic implications of NATO’s 
inability to halt the emerging insurgency. 
4.3 2006 - 2009 Continuing Divisions 
The worsening security situation in Afghanistan, and the demanding nature of fighting 
an insurgency was now beginning to severely wear on the Alliance. The negative 
politically and military dividing trends of the previously discussed expansion period 
continued, and were magnified as allied death tolls rose, and it became more and more 
apparent that ISAF was severely undermanned and lacked operational flexibility. On a 
positive note, some progress was made in terms of European capabilities development 
in the period. 
4.3.1 An Emerging Insurgency 
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By the move in to the unstable and hostile south and the following combat 
engagements with the Taliban in 2006, the transatlantic dynamics within NATO 
changed in comparison to the earlier periods. The initial political unity created by the 
War on Terror was by this time severely weakened. As previously documented 
Germany contributed significant forces to OEF in 2001, including special operation 
forces. By 2006, however, the German forces in Afghanistan did not even share 
intelligence gathered by their Tornado reconnaissance planes under ISAF command 
with American forces wearing the OEF badge. In fear of that the intelligence would be 
used by the Americans in a way that was incompatible with the mandate given the 
Germany Military by its Government. This was a result of a decision by the Budestag 
that such intelligence sharing would be in breach of the national limitations the 
parliament had placed upon the German Forces' operations in Afghanistan (Noetzel & 
Scheipers 2007). The operations were to be strictly confined to support and 
stabilization efforts. Despite the initial efforts to mend the transatlantic organizational 
and military capabilities division revealed at the start of the War on Terror, the US was 
shouldering the bulk of the burden, and the political division was now as prominent as 
the organizational and military division was in 2001. 
Leading up to the 2006 NATO Summit meeting in Riga President Bush urged the 
Allies to shoulder a greater part of the burden in Afghanistan. The Bush White House's 
vision of NATO's role in its Global War on Terror had been further strained by the 
disproportionate effort in Afghanistan. NATO's future relevance from the American 
point of view was questioned. US Ambassador to NATO Victoria Nuland voiced the 
US concern over lacking European will and ability in 2006: “If we can't do missions 
like that of Afghanistan, then we can't do our overall mission” (quoted in Dale 
2006:3). The Ambassador draws a direct connection between the future of Afghanistan 
and the future of NATO. The US came to Riga with an agenda of addressing the 
problem of and reducing ISAF caveats. The Summit Declaration in itself only reflects 
this indirectly, but the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's declaration on the Riga 
Summit reads: “Forces deployed for NATO missions must have the flexibility to 
perform the range of operations demanded by a particular mission. All efforts should 
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be made to reduce the use of national caveats which all too often restrict national 
contingents from participating in operations to their full capacity” (NATO 2006c). 
At Riga the Allies decided to further strengthen their commitment to NATO 
transformation by agreeing on a Comprehensive Political Guidance.  The Guidance is 
according to the Riga Summit Declaration (NATO 2006a) an agreement “which 
provides a framework and political direction for NATO’s continuing transformation, 
setting out, for the next 10-15 years, the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, 
planning disciplines and intelligence.” The influence of the War on Terror paradigm 
becomes apparent when the Guidance document states that “Over the next 10 to 15 
years, the evolving security environment and the need to deal with conventional and 
especially asymmetric threats and risks, wherever they arise, will put a premium on 
improvements in meeting …capability requirements” (NATO 2006b). 
The RMA school of thought prescribing a “light footprint” in Afghanistan as to avoid 
being caught in the same swamp of nation building as the Soviets once were, was the 
prevailing wisdom for the first years of the conflict. Then US Deputy Secretary of 
Defence Paul Wolfowitz said in November 2001: “In fact, one of the lessons of 
Afghanistan’s history, which we’ve tried to apply in this campaign, is if you’re a 
foreigner, try not to go in. If you do go in, don’t stay too long…” (quoted in Roberts 
2009:29).  By 2006 it had become abundantly clear that this strategy was a failure. The 
Taliban may have retreated, but they where not defeated. While the period from 2001 
to 2004 was a relatively pacific period given the circumstances, there was a sharp 
incline in violence in 2005 that continues to this day. The Taliban and other anti-
governmental forces, most notably the Hezb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, used 
the time after the invasion to regroup and reorganize. This is in line with the classic 
guerrilla and insurgent tactics. As Mao thought his soldiers: “The enemy advances, we 
retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, 
we pursue” (Stewart 2006:40). Asymmetrical tactics such as roadside IEDs and suicide 
bombings were introduced, likely adopted from the Iraqi insurgency. NATO and ISAF 
were now fighting a potent insurgent force hiding among the general population. This 
is far removed from the initial mandate and origin of what was supposed to be a 
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security assistance force. European perceptions of NATO's role in Afghanistan needed 
to be severely adjusted (Korski 2008). The initial expectations preeminent among the 
European populations and elites of that ISAF would resemble the peacekeeping of 
KFOR more than OEF, meant that the European allies were ill prepared for handling 
loss of allied lives and the involvement in heavy combat in Afghanistan. The 
deteriorating security development in Afghanistan affected the transatlantic 
relationship negatively as it further revealed the transatlantic gap in the understanding 
of the role of military might in fighting terrorism. This gap had been present form the 
start, but brought to the surface by the disproportionate burden-sharing as ISAF faced 
combat in southern Afghanistan. 
The initial “light footprint” model was abandoned in favor of the Comprehensive 
Approach. The Comprehensive Approach underlines the importance of civil-military 
cooperation and coordination. Security, development and governance are three equal 
parts of a whole, none of which can be neglected if stability is to be achieved. This 
meant that NATO's strategy became more dependent on cooperation with the other 
international actors working in Afghanistan such as the UN Assistance Mission to 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) and NGOs, as well as the Afghan government on both 
national and local levels. Out of the trinity of the Comprehensive Approach NATO 
only specialize in security, and even the security situation did not develop according to 
plan. Insurgent activity increased steeply from 2007 to 2008 rising from an average of 
12,4 to 18,4 attacks per day (Roggio & Radin 2008).  
Insurgency can be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling 
authoreties in which the non-ruling group uses political mans and violence to 
undermine or destroy the ruling group's legitimacy, with the ultimate aim of resuming 
rule. It is important to note that an insurgency always has a political side. In 
Afghanistan this is manifested by the Talibans “night letters” of intimidation, and the 
establishment of local governments and courts that adhere to the Taliban and not the 
official governments rule. The enormous discrepancy between the international forces 
and the Taliban causes the latter to apply asymmetrical tactics such as IED's and 
suicide-bombings. The insurgent forces through these asymmetrical means translate 
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their tactical inferiority into strategic superiority. These tactics relate to terrorism in 
the sense that the ultimate targets of, for instance, the IED's is not simply the soldiers 
directly killed or wounded. As important is the audience watching at home in the US 
and Europe. This is amply illustrated by Taliban spokesman Zaibullah Mujahid's 
comments on Norwegian television news the day after a Norwegian officer was killed 
in a suicide-bombing: “These are your children, do not let them die for American 
interests. Pull your forces out of Afghanistan” (TV2 News April 17th 2009). In a 
Clausewitzian manner the insurgents attack the political will of the opponent, which 
constitutes the strategic center of gravity for the Alliance. A consensus based 
multilateral organization such as NATO is likely more vulnerable to such 
asymmetrical propaganda based tactics than states acting unilaterally. Formal alliances 
like NATO are, on the other hand, better suited than volatile collations of the willing. 
As most of the European allies' contributions are so small that their pulling out of the 
conflict would have little or no direct influence on ISAF's ability to win military in 
Afghanistan11, danger of allies acting as free riders is a real issue of concern. If for 
instance Belgium was to pull out their roughly 500 men and women the military 
implications on the ground would be minimal or non-existing. The political 
ramifications of allies pulling out, however, are substantial. A chain reaction of 
European allies pulling out is something both the US and NATO is rightly worried 
about. The absence of Afghanistan as a free harbor of international terrorism is a non-
discriminate good. If the US does achieve this aim, its allies in Europe benefit greatly 
from it regardless of whether they contributed to its fulfillment or not. However, 
despite this all European NATO allies, and more than fifteen other states, have 
contributed to ISAF and many of them to the OEF before that. This is in part due to 
the genuine transatlantic solidarity created by the massive acts or Terrorism on 9/11, 
but foremostly the European interest in keeping a strong NATO as an institutional 
framework limiting the US. These dynamics have moderated the politically dividing 
impact of the Afghan experience. Even though the Dutch have all but pulled out and 
                                                 
11
 13 of the 28 allied contingents to ISAF were as of October 2010 composed of less than 400 troops (ISAF 
2010) 
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the Canadians are planning to follow them, we have not yet witnessed the feared 
domino effect. For the US the importance of these minor military contributions lie 
with in the added legitimacy of multilateralism to the Afghan War, which politically 
speaking is significant. That said, greater European military contributions is still very 
much sought after by the the US.  
Furthermore the US, like Europe, has an interest in a relevant and strong NATO. For 
the US the Alliance serves as an extended arm of influence into European security 
politics. These mutually beneficial factors strongly moderate the long-term 
implications of the division generated by the disproportionate burden-sharing in 
Afghanistan.  
The most basic principles of countering an insurgency is summed up in the three small 
words: clear - hold - build. That is; clear the area of identifiable enemies, stay there 
and hold the ground so the enemy does not immediately return to prominence, and 
build tangible progress and development as to ensure the support of the locals. 
Winning the support of the local villagers is at the heart of all COIN operations. Local 
support through supplies and shelter are as important to insurgents as water is to fish. 
The single most important element of winning local support for ISAF is avoiding 
collateral damage. In other words stopping the accidental killing of non-combatants. 
COIN doctrine thus requires less emphasis on force protection and especially the use 
of close air support. Furthermore, COIN requires much higher troop numbers as 
holding ground is a central part of the strategy. Those higher troop numbers were, 
however, not to appear until Obama’s surge in late 2009. 
In the time from NATO adopting its countrywide mandate in Afghanistan leading up 
to 2009, both OEF and ISAF were under-manned and relied heavily on Air Power. As 
Roberts (2009:49) puts it “In military terms, a light footprint on the ground inevitably 
means a heavy air presence”. In 2006 116 Afghans non-combatants were killed in 
ISAF bombings. In 2007 the number was close to three times higher at 321 dead non-
combatants after air strikes. In 2008 the number was somewhat reduced to at least 152 
killed. Thirty-three of which were in a single air strike by the US in the 22nd of 
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August (Roberts 2009:41-41). As the former (2003 - 2005) Afghan Minster of the 
Interior Mr. Ali A. Jalali wrote in Parameters (2007:15): “NATO... sees itself 
responsible for the military action in counterinsurgency efforts, but often only when 
and where it can utilize firepower as a substitute for its limited number of forces”. 
ISAF's continuously low troop levels had become a serious impediment to achieving 
its mission objective. This realization of ISAF inadequacy slowly dawned on both 
Washington and Brussels. However, with President Obama taking office in January 
2009, as is embellished upon in the next chapter, it became evident that the response 
would come in form of an Americanization of the War and not a greater emphasis on a 
united NATO effort. This is a sign of the heightened political division created by the 
lack of adequate burden-sharing.  
In the period 2006 - 2008 the insurgency was still very much located to the south. In 
fact the insurgent activities were highly concentrated on a quite small geographical 
area. According to a UN (2008:5) report 70 percent of all insurgent incidents reported 
occurred in 10 percent (40) of Afghanistan's districts, home to a mere 6 percent of the 
total population. As the great majority of COIN operations in the period 2006 to 2008 
took place in the south where American and British troops are dominant, the caveats 
prohibiting the majority of the allies from traveling south became even more of a 
military and politically dividing issue. Out of the then 35 000 ISAF troops 11 000 non-
American troops were located to Regional Command South almost half (5 200) of 
which were British. The same UN report also concluded that the insurgency was now 
spreading, in particular to the far north-west and the provinces bordering Kabul (UN 
2008:5). 
Afghanistan was at this point beginning to seriously wear and tear on the commitment 
of several NATO allies, and none more so than the ones engaged in the south. In 
January 2008 in a meeting with President Bush Canadian Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper faced the president with an ultimatum. The prime minister made it clear that 
unless other allies came to Canada's immediate assistance in Kandahar province, the 
Canadian participation would not be extended beyond 2009 (Fox News 2008). 
Approaching a 2008 Defence Ministers meeting in Villinus Canadian Defence 
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Minister Mackay told the press that “We want to see more of a one-for-all approach, 
including more burden-sharing in the south”, and in undiplomatic terms added “That’s 
non-negotiable” referring to the Canadian troop request (Reuters 2008). Canada had at 
this point suffered 78 deaths in their efforts to quench the insurgents in the southern 
province, and the conservative Canadian government of the time was experiencing 
rising domestic public opinion against the war. The Canadian demand and their 
steadfastness led to the US being forced to committing an additional 3 200 marines to 
Kandahar on a short term deployment to appease their neighbor to the north (Orr 
2009). On the other side of the Atlantic the Dutch were also starting rumblings of 
pulling out of the southern Uruzgan province12. None of the European allies were 
willing to lift the caveats restraining them to the north of the country. A clear indicator 
of that the degree of political unity required to subdue individual national interests in 
pursuit of the common alliance good, was not present.  
Before the Villinus meeting Secretary Gates sent written letters to all the allied 
Defence Ministers calling on them to contribute troops to the south. After the meeting, 
he revealed to the press that he had failed to receive any replies. Witnessing Europe’s 
unwillingness to take on more of the burden in Afghanistan the Secretary commented 
that: “I think that it puts a cloud over the future of the alliance if this is to endure and 
perhaps even get worse”. Only the Canadians, Britons, Dutch, Australian and Danes, 
are “really out there on the line and fighting” he further remarked (The Guardian 
2008). The signs of increasing political division became apparent as Secretary General 
Scheffer told reporters he rather see Gates making these requests in private (The 
Guardian 2008). 
The 2008 Strategic Vision for ISAF makes clear references to inadequate burden-
sharing. The US was at this time engaged in persistent efforts of drawing the European 
allies into more dangerous operations in the south (Sperling and Webber 2009:502). 
The Strategic Vision Document states that the Allies need to “support each other in 
                                                 
12
  The Dutch talk of exit was, however, also mitigated for the time and their stay extended by two 
years (The Australian 2007). 
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sharing the burden”, “filling remaining ISAF shortfalls” and “provide maximum 
possible flexibility for use of our forces by the ISAF commander” (ISAF 2008). At the 
2008 NAC meeting in Brussels the allied foreign ministers underlined that “We remain 
determined to provide ISAF with the forces, resources, and flexibility to ensure the 
mission’s success” (NATO 2008). The divisions created by the European caveats 
preventing the operational flexibility sought after by the US, was now becoming 
apparent even at the top political level of the Alliance.    
This in spite strong pleads from US secretary Gates leading up to the Villinus meeting 
for more of the European allies to travel south. The Secretary famously warned of “a 
two-tier alliance in which you have some allies willing to fight and die… and other 
who are not” (Reuters 2008). He received strong backing from both Britain and the 
Netherlands with the Dutch Defence Minister Middelkoop commenting “We all have 
to realize… that we have to do the job in a proper way” on his American colleagues 
remark (Reuters 2008). The German Minister on the other hand stated that “I think we 
are doing our bit fully in Afghanistan” (Reuters 2008). Neither the German nor the 
French yielded to the pressure of committing troops to the south. By January the Dutch 
government collapsed over the question to once again renew the troop commitment to 
Afghanistan and announced that the troops were leaving by the end of the year (NY 
Times 2010). From February to October 2010 the Dutch contribution was reduced 
from 1885 to a mere 380 troops (ISAF 2010a & ISAF 2010b). 
These developments are indicative of how the transatlantic political unity created 
within NATO in 2001 and sustained to about 2005 now was to a large extent eroded 
by the Afghanistan experience. This political division spills over in to the Military 
dimensions by hampering some of the practical war-time integration and 
interoperability developments that would have been greater if all the allies worked 
together where they were the most needed. An extent of the potential military unity 
afforded by ISAF thus suffers form the higher degree of political division in this 
period. 
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The picture that faced the newly elected President Obama in 2009 was that the cracks 
in the European commitment to the cause of Afghanistan were becoming more and 
more apparent. 
4.3.2 The NRF and the PCC – Slowly Progressing 
At the 2006 Riga Summit the NRF was declared ready and at Full Operational 
Capacity (FOC). The Summit deceleration reads “The establishment of the NATO 
Response Force (NRF) which today is at full operational capability has been a key 
development. It plays a vital part in the Alliance’s response to a rapidly emerging 
crisis. It also serves as a catalyst for transformation and interoperability and will 
enhance the overall quality of our armed forces... ” (NATO 2006). The announcement 
of  FOC at Riga was, however, a desperate effort mainly to avoid embarrassment and 
is described among NATO officials as “completely fictitious” (Ringsmose 2010:293). 
The force was in reality still under-manned. While it may not have been truly at FOC 
in 2006 the NRF certainly had made some considerable headway from 2002 to 2006. 
By 2006 the NRF had undertaken training missions where it combined both air, sea 
and land units, and conducted demanding task such as precision fighter bombing, 
special forces assaults and naval bombardment (Kugler 2007:10). This indicates that 
while the lack of burden sharing in Afghanistan wielded a dividing effect on the 
political level, Europe was actually making substantial progress in bridging the 
transatlantic capabilities gap. The organizational and military divide, that had been 
evident in the time following 2001, had been lessened. Then Secretary General 
Scheffer expressed the positive sentiment of NATO adapting to the demands of the 
War on Terror in a speech following the above mentioned exercise: “You see here the 
new NATO, a NATO which has the possibility to be expeditionary, to project stability. 
The NRF is the most important tool to show in which way and how NATO has 
transformed and is transforming” (quoted in Kugler 2007).  
By 2006 there were, however, still significant shortcomings on the European side 
especially in terms of expeditionary capabilities and communications technology 
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which is vital to transatlantic interoperability. Still Kugler (2007:17) describes the 
situation of the NRF in 2006 as “product of successful NATO innovation that began in 
2002, accelerated during 2003 – 2006, and continues today. Future success will 
depend upon how much effort NATO, the Europeans, and the United States invest in 
bringing this force to full capability and life”. 
4.3.3 Three Dimensions of Unity and Division 
In the period of accelerating insurgency resistance form 2006 - 2009, as in the 
preceding period (2003- 2006), national interests were to a large extent put before 
NATO interests in Afghanistan. American and other allies’ pleads for more allies to 
contribute, in the south, where the real fighting was taking place, fell on deaf ears. 
Most of the European allies were still not willing to share in that risk. European 
expectations of a benign development, stemming from the time before ISAF’s 
expansion to the south, were greatly miss-matched with the raising death tolls and the 
demanding COIN operations. Throughout the period these factors further intensified 
the effects of political division that started in 2005, when the NAC began experiencing 
divisions over ISAF’s ROE, and the new and far more offensive nature of the Security 
Assistance force. 
As to the organizational dimension in 2006 – 2009, the NRF progressed in a somewhat 
flawed manner often not reaching its troop requirements (Ringsmose 2009). This is to 
a large degree a consequence of the ISAF mission draining much of the European 
capabilities that otherwise could have been directed at fulfilling NRF contingents. 
ISAF has completely dominated the NATO agenda for seven years, and the NRF has 
come second at best. In this manner ISAF distracted from and hampered the 
development of the NRF, and thus wielded a dividing organizational effect. In is to a 
significant extent the impact of Afghanistan that has led to that the force, which 
General James Jones deemed to be one of the most important organizational 
developments of NATO, to be less of a success. 
65 
 
As for the military dimension, on the other hand, the NRF did in the time from 2006 - 
2010 prove its utility in being a potential catalyst of national capabilities development. 
Although significant European shortcoming remained, the development was heading 
in the right direction. In this sense the paradigm of War on Terror brought a unifying 
effect to the military dimension of the period.     
4.4 2009 - 2010 Americanization – Obama’s War 
President Obama took office in January 2009 after a campaign where he vowed to 
make Afghanistan the number one priority for US Foreign and Security policy. From 
taking office to October 2010 he has almost quadrupled the US’s troop contingent to 
ISAF from 23 000 to 90 000 (ISAF 2009; ISAF 2010b). Afghanistan has become 
“Obama’s War”, and the legacy of his first term will unavoidably be closely linked 
with the War. Part of that legacy will be the Americanization of ISAF. The European 
influence in ISAF has in 2009 - 2010 progressively diminished. This is to a large 
extent a consequence of the transatlantic political division that has been building since 
NATO entered southern Afghanistan in 2006.  
4.4.1 Americanization of ISAF 
The COIN strategy of NATO came into full fruition with the creation of ISAF 
Commander General McChrystal's Counterinsurgency Guidance document launched 
in August 2009. McChrystal with this introduced the concept of zero tolerance for 
civilian casualties. The former ISAF Commander McKirnean was succeeded by 
McChrystal in the wake of just such a substantial accidental civilian killing by ISAF 
forces on May 4th 2009 (The Guardian 2009b). The very rare mid-fight change of top 
command in May 2009 marks a watershed in the international military engagement in 
Afghanistan, and signifies the changes introduced by the Obama White House. 
Secretary of Defence Gates was quoted as saying he seeks “fresh thinking and fresh 
eyes” on Afghanistan and that “We have a new strategy, a new mission, and a new 
ambassador. I believe that new military leadership is also needed” (Washington Post 
2009). Anonymous Pentagon officials are reported to have stated that McKiernan was 
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partly fired for being too traditional in his thinking and not embracing the emerging 
new COIN doctrine that was quickly gaining popularity in Washington, and that he 
had been too easy on reluctant European allies (The Guardian 2009a). The 
aforementioned COIN Guidance document breaks with traditional military responses 
to asymmetrical conflict as “a bull that repeatedly charges a matador's cape – only to 
tire and eventually be defeated by a much weaker opponent” and goes on to state that 
“We need to think and act very different to be successful” (ISAF 2009). The firing of 
McKiernan and the introduction of the COIN campaign under McChrystal thus 
signifies the Americanization of the Afghan engagement. 
The new strategy makes it clear that the measure of success no longer is the number of 
Taliban or Al-Qaeda killed. NATO and ISAF are in Afghanistan engaged in a struggle 
for the support of the average Afghan man or woman. “Essentially, we and the 
insurgents are presenting an argument for the future of Afghanistan: they will decide 
which argument is the most attractive, most convincing, and has the greatest chance of 
success” (ISAF 2009).  The war is to be won by denying the subversive influence of 
the insurgents who seek to undermine the government and alternately harass and cajole 
the local public to join in there cause. Protecting the people is now the mission and the 
indirect measure of success. “The conflict will succeed by persuading the population, 
not by destroying the enemy” (ISAF 2009). Shifting the balance in the public in the 
way that this COIN strategy outlines is a tremendously costly undertaking. Both in 
terms of money, but even more sincerely – in lives. The strategy requires higher troop 
numbers and far greater risk taken by the Western troops than classical military 
doctrine does. 
Another aspect of the development that drives the increasing American dominance is 
the more and more central role played by Pakistan. Pakistan has since the start of the 
insurgency served as a sanctuary for the opposing forces where they rest and resupply. 
Under Obama drone-attacks on Pakistani territory has increased, and the regional 
aspect of the conflict seems to have gained attention (CRS Report 2009b:32). A key 
aspect of Obama’s Afghanistan strategy has been a more coherent US Policy on 
Pakistan (CRS Report 2009a). This development makes the bilateral connections 
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between the US and Pakistan ever more central, and thus contributes to further 
Americanization on NATO’s expense.  
The new COIN Strategy is an American Strategy. It was conceived, developed and 
implemented by and through Washington and the Pentagon, and not the NAC. With 
the surge of 90 000 American troops, Washington’s domination over Brussels in the 
matters of Afghanistan has increased. Neither in the firings of General McKiernan nor 
McChrystal, as commanders of the NATO force ISAF, was the NAC involved. This is 
highly indicative of a transatlantic political divide and Americanization of the war 
where Washington no longer bothers to root its ISAF policies in the NAC. While the 
firing of General McChrystal was highly unexpected, the ramifications in terms of 
policy changes are likely to be miniscule as General Petreaus was one of the most 
central behind-the-scenes figures in McChrystals COIN campaign and his superior at 
the time of its creation. The continuation of the COIN campaign affects upon the 
transatlantic dynamics of burden-sharing as well the implications of the political 
Americanization.         
The American surge in 2009 and the development of ISAF into a full-fledge COIN 
operation has affected the transatlantic burden-sharing relationship in two ways. 
Firstly, the vast majority of these additional soldiers have been American. Thus, the 
transatlantic balance of troop contributions has shifted. Between December 2008 and 
February 2010 the ISAF troop count doubled form roughly 50 000 to 100 000 soldiers, 
however, 42 000 of the 50 000 man increase came from the US alone (ISAF 2008, 
ISAF 2010). By 2010 the US delivered 60 percent of all ISAF troops. The balance 
shifted from The US is now bearing an even greater share of the burden in terms of 
numbers.  
Secondly, COIN requires significantly greater risks on behalf of the ISAF troops. As 
COIN doctrine demands less reliance on air support and increased contact with the 
population making the troops vulnerable for attack. This raises the human cost of 
contributing troops. Since the formation of the Afghan insurgency began in 2005 the 
death toll for NATO troops have increased steadily. In 2004 the international forces 
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(OEF and ISAF) sustained 60 combat-fatalities. By 2005 the number more than 
doubled to 131, after 2009 troop increase the number reached 521, and by November 
2010 the number was 655 deaths (icasaulties.org 2010).   
These two factors combined – the balance of troop contributions is shifted towards the 
US in terms of numbers, and the human cost of every contribution is increased – 
indicate heightened transatlantic political and military division. NATO is looking more 
and more like the Alliance Secretary Gates warned of when he spoke of a two-tiered 
Alliance where some are willing to fight and die and other are not. 
Leading up to the December 2009 force generation conference for ISAF at NATO HQ, 
the Obama Administration publicly voiced that it would seek an expanded European 
contribution to ISAF. The number that was circulated was an additional 10 000 troops 
(NY Times 2009). By mid 2010 the non-American ISAF troop numbers had actually 
risen, but only by roughly 5 000, including significantly increased contributions from 
Turkey, Poland and Italy (ISAF 2010). Major allies Germany and France made it clear 
that the unpopular public standing of the War in their home publics made further 
contributions out of the question (NY Times 2009). Obama, in other words, got half of 
what he asked for. Furthermore, the additional European troops were still bound by the 
plentiful national caveats hampering their effective utilization, which in effect makes 
the contribution less than the sum of its parts. 
With a new President in the White House, significant changes was also introduced to 
the paradigm of War on Terror. Firstly, the very contents of the concept changed. 
Obama’s NSS of 2010 is much more oriented towards the Far East, as in India and 
China, than its predecessor the Bush NSS of 2006. The break with the Bush paradigm 
of War on Terror is completely explicit. As the earlier quoted the 2002 NSS blatantly 
states: 
The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global 
reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or 
ideology. The enemy is terrorism— premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against innocents. 
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Bush’s second NSS in 2006 goes on to, in no uncertain terms, underline the War on 
Terror: 
America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the 
grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology 
of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 
2000. 
The 2010 NSS on the other hand reads: 
The United States is waging a global campaign against al-Qa’ida and its 
terrorist affiliates. …We will always seek to delegitimize the use of terrorism 
and to isolate those who carry it out. Yet this is not a global war against a 
tactic—terrorism or a religion—Islam. We are at war with a specific network, 
al-Qa’ida, and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United 
States, our allies, and partners. 
The former “War on Terror” is now consistently referred to as a “campaign against 
terror”. The change in rhetoric is major and it is interesting to note how the NSS of 
2010 almost goes out of its way to explicitly contradict its predecessor. Obama’s 
rhetoric is much closer to the one preferred in Europe, which in self signifies a 
transatlantic politically unifying effect. The hard facts on the ground in Afghanistan, 
however, speak to the contrary. The continuity from War on Terror paradigm 
implemented on Iraq is highly evident in Obama’s Afghanistan. Although Obama does 
not use the term “Surge”, probably to avoid comparison with his former, that is exactly 
the policy he has implemented in Afghanistan since taking office. The transition plan 
(ISAF phase five) that was adopted at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit follows 
closely the transition plan of Iraq that was previously implemented. All the Allies 
share an interest of leaving Afghanistan as soon as possible. However, the continued 
disproportionate burden-sharing and Americanization of the War since 2009 point to 
that the Obama move in rhetoric towards Europe has produced very limited political 
unity within NATO.  
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Furthermore, the standing of Terrorism as the perceived supreme threat to international 
security is fading. Thus the importance of the paradigm of War on Terror in guiding 
US policy is shifting as well. It can be argued, that the major Wars of the 20th century 
were brought on by states that were too powerful like the Soviet Union and Nazi 
Germany. Since the end of the Cold War, and in particularly since 2001, the prevailing 
wisdom has been that now it is the other way around. The major threats to the US, and 
other Western states, have been perceived to stem from failing states. States that are 
unwilling or unable too keep control over their territories and thus become safe 
harbors from terrorists. In other words sates that are too weak. In the last few years we 
have began to see the emerging reversal of the Terrorism as the supreme threat. The 
growing economic powers of countries like Russia, India and China have moved the 
focus of the US back to more traditional threats. The, so far, culmination of this 
development is the Russian – Georgian war of late summer 2008. This development 
has also hit NATO through its current work on a new Strategic Concept. The Albright 
et al. (2010) report from the Group of Experts designated to advice on the coming 
Strategic Concept signifies a move away from Terrorism as the defining threat for 
NATO in the 21st century. For the prospects of NATO’s political unity this is likely a 
positive development. For the Eastern European members such as the Baltic states, the 
desire to move the focus from Afghanistan and international terrorism, to NATO-
partner-country Russia has been paramount following the Russian - Georgian conflict. 
Furthermore, Afghanistan and the ISAF mission have played a significant role in 
lessening the transatlantic capabilities gap that has been a transatlantic issue since 
NATO’s conception and in particularly after the Cold War (ACT 2009). The dividing 
influence in this military transatlantic imbalance has varied with other circumstances. 
The conflicts in the Balkans in the nineties, and Afghanistan since 2003 has brought 
the issue to the top of the NATO agenda. More, however, than their military ability it 
has been the European allies lacking political will to fight that as put a political and 
military strain on NATO in Afghanistan. 
These developments are likely to lessen the long term damage of the political division 
created over the last years by the Afghan War as NATO retracts to what is often 
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labeled its more traditional Article 5 oriented nature. The terrain gained in European 
capabilities development and NATO’s organizational transformation over the last 
seven years remains vital to NATO, and will very likely signify a long term politically 
unifying effect. As the Albright et al. (2010:8) report states “NATO’s core commitment 
– embodied in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – is unchanged, but the 
requirements for fulfilling that commitment has shifted in shape”. The often drawn 
distinction between an “Article 5 focused” Alliance, and an “out-of-area” focused 
Alliance is in regard to the organizational and military dimensions a false dichotomy. 
Both require modern and expeditionary forces with airlift capabilities at hand. And 
most importantly: both require transatlantic interoperability. To again quote the 
Albright et al. (2010:19) report: 
NATO planners must recognize that the potential sources of Article 5 threats have 
broadened and now include dangers that could arise either inside or outside the 
Euro-Atlantic region. NATO must be prepared to defend against (and deter) such 
threats regardless of their point of origin. 
4.4.2 The NRF and the PCC – Achieving Transformation 
Much justified criticism had been leveled against the NRF: it has been chronically 
under manned with an average troop fill rate of 69 percent and has been scaled down 
at several occasions. (Ringsmose 2009). Furthermore it has suffered from strongly 
diverging views on its application and to this date it has only been used in real-life-
operations twice. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and after the 2008 Pakistani 
earthquake (Kugler 2007). However, in regards to the NRF's aim of driving European 
military transformation it has by 2009 been relatively successful. 
In January 2009 the ACT conducted an evaluation of the NRF’s role in NATO 
transformation as part of a report delivered to the International Military Staff in 
Brussels. The report named “NATO Reponses Force: Transformational Benefits” sets 
the fulfillment of the PCC requirements as its criteria for assessing the 
transformational success of the NRF. It states that several nations, mentioned by name 
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are Poland, Denmark and The Netherlands have “drastically altered the focus and 
capabilities of their forces”. The ACT report further observes that “significant 
progress in policy and funding, capability development and military interoperability” 
has been made, and concludes that “…it is clear that meaningful and important 
transformational benefits generated through the NRF have been realized”. The NRF 
has been an important factor in driving European military transformation including 
creating both expeditionary capabilities and an emerging expeditionary mind-set in 
European NATO capitals. The NRF is ascribed the central role in the realization of the 
PCC, a process which is regarded as rather successful (NATO ACT 2009, Ringsmose 
2009:292). The report points to that European governments have made explicit 
reference to their NRF commitments when justifying their defence prioreties vis-à-vis 
their home parliaments. The report also states that “ …nations are no longer 
maintaining forces designed exclusively for territorial defence, they have committed 
themselves to building and maintaining strong forces also capable of conducting 
expeditionary operations”.  
The report underlines the importance of the NRF’s rotational nature in facilitating 
transformation. The NRF consists, at all times, of a multinational force on six months 
stand-by with a readiness to deploy worldwide within five days. Before becoming 
operational every NRF rotation trains together for six months as to ensure 
interoperability and national adaption to NATO doctrine. Every six month rotation on 
stand-by is also followed by a six moth stand-down period. This rotational structure 
has served to enhance transformation and capabilities development by allowing all 
NATO members to access to the benefits of participating in the NRF, and 
subsequently bringing the new gained knowledge and experience back home when 
reintegrated in their national militaries. By this, both the newer and the smaller 
Alliance members have gained unique experience in multinational expeditionary 
operations. Through this a broadening in the pool of nations able to contribute to 
current and future NATO missions has taken place. Furthermore, another important 
dimension is the formal and informal socialization into an expeditionary mind-set and 
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the NATO latest NATO approved doctrine that a contribution to a NRF rotation 
entails. 
The majority of the military capabilities at NATO’s disposal are in fact national 
capabilities provided by the member states. There has, however, also been a 
strengthening of the commonly funded NATO capabilities.  Since the beginning of the 
War on Terror NATO has approved its collective logistics capacities by moving 
previous national responsibilities to the collective level, thus increasing multinational 
jointness and unity of command within logistics through the Joint Logistics Support 
Group for the NRF. At for the national level there is the example of Slovenia, which 
contributed a platoon within a multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 
Nuclear Defence Battalion (CBRN DefBn) that was part of the fourth NRF in 2004. 
Capitalizing on this experience Slovenia expanded their capacities within CBRN-
defence and by NRF 10 their contribution had grown from a platoon to a company, 
and by 2009 info a full-fledged CBRN DefBn of their own (NATO ACT 2009:11). 
There is little doubt that the War on Terror, with its emphasis on expeditionary 
deployable forces, as the guiding paradigm of American security policy and the 
alliance cohesion created by the 9/11 attacks and the following sidelining of NATO in 
Afghanistan is the source of these developments. As the ACT Report (p.7) clearly 
states “… the real impetus for change came with the 9/11 attacks against the United 
States of America”.   
It seems evident that the growing political division within the Alliance, on account of 
the negative developments of Afghanistan as the War has progressed especially since 
2005, has not hindered to allies in moving towards unity in regards to interoperability 
within the military dimension.  
4.4.3 Three Dimensions of Unity and Division 
Afghanistan has in the time 2009 to 2010, like the preceding two periods, increasingly 
divided the allies politically, despite a convergence in transatlantic rhetoric. The main 
reason for this continued negative development is the European aversion towards 
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accepting the risk-sharing that the COIN operations increasingly demand. The ISAF 
operations has become highly Americanized, not only in terms of the number of troops 
on the ground in Afghanistan, but also in regard to Washington, at the expense of 
Brussels, to a higher extent taking charge of the Force.  
As for the military dimension, the 2009 ACT Report reveals that the American War on 
Terror paradigm that initiated the launch of the transformation efforts, over the longer 
term since 2001, when compared to the nineties, has wielded a substantial militarily 
unifying effect on the Alliance. The impact on the military dimension has thus moved 
from initial division, to a higher degree of unity. While the development for the 
political dimension has moved the Alliance from initial strong unity, to increased 
divisions. Once more this makes evident the added value of avoiding a monolithic 
analytical concept of NATO. The PCC has managed to propel European capabilities 
transformation in a manner the DCI did not. This is largely thanks to the 
organizational development of the NRF. The NRF does suffer from the political 
divisions created by Afghanistan, and ISAF as a competing consumer of resources. It 
has – at best – been a limited failure as a whole. However, as an organizational catalyst 
for capabilities transformation the NRF has been relatively successful. Driving 
transformation was always a central part of the rationale behind the NRF, and in this 
regard the paradigm of War on Terror has wielded an organisationally partly unifying 
effect on the alliance. I say partly, however, because the ISAF and war in Afghanistan 
at the same time has wielded a counter working dividing organizational effect, through 
sapping potential resources and devotion form the Response Force.     
In the next, and final, chapter I present the key empirical outcomes from the entire 
period (2001 - 2010) and discuss the theoretical implications.  
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5 Conclusions 
The question under scrutiny for this thesis was the nature and extent of the mark left 
on the transatlantic relations of NATO after nine years of the War on Terror paradigm, 
and seven years fighting on the ground in Afghanistan. In order to illuminate the 
Afghan War’s impact on NATO, I have utilized the analytical concepts of unity and 
division. The yardstick that has been applied in the analysis has been the degree of 
European adaption to American led initiatives of transformation, in the period of 
interest. To begin with I asked; to what extent has NATO's Afghan engagement, so far, 
served to be a source of greater transatlantic unity, or a source of division, within the 
Alliance? 
The short answer to this is: the Afghanistan engagement has been a source of limited 
political division, and substantial improvements in organizational and military unity.  
I shall in the following first present a concentrated review of the most prominent 
empirical conclusions of the analysis. Thereafter I proceed to frame the conclusions in 
a grander theoretical context. Finlay, I present some concluding remarks and 
recommendations for further research.    
5.1 Key Empirical Outcomes 
To avoid a one-dimensional understanding of NATO that might obscure as much as it 
enlightens I divided the analysis in accordance with three analytical dimensions, 
namely the Political, Organizational and Military. This allows for the analysis to 
differentiate, recognize and incorporate forces working in opposing directions within 
NATO. A monolithic analytical concept of NATO that does not leave room for such a 
differentiation is perpetually prone to simplification in assessing the impact of 
Afghanistan on the Alliance. Successfully nuancing such simplifications is, arguably, 
the most important empirical contribution of this thesis to the larger body of work 
written on NATO, Afghanistan and Transatlantic Relations.  
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As stated in the analysis, Rupp (2006:93) is a prime example of such a failure to 
recognize the multiple dimensions of NATO when he, in his analysis of NATO’s first 
year following 9/11, argues that: “Instead of unifying and responding effectively to the 
new dangers in the system, the member states of NATO experienced their greatest 
sustained internal conflict since the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1949”. 
However, as I have thoroughly proven in my analysis, the Prague Summit of spring 
2002 was in fact a display of transatlantic cooperation and unity, through the allies 
seriously addressing the issues plaguing NATO, and implementing strong measures to 
correct them. 
While the predominant claim in the literature (see e.g. Knutsen forthcoming; Rupp 
2006; Noetzel & Schereer 2009) that Afghanistan has been a dividing experience for 
the Transatlantic Alliance for a large extent holds ground, it is a simplification and 
needs both moderation and specification. The statement only holds true in regard to the 
political dimension, and only from 2006 and on. From 2001 to 2005 in the aftermath 
of 9/11 the Alliance experienced a significantly stronger sense of transatlantic political 
unity than in both the preceding and the subsequent period. The main consequence of 
the US decision to proceed in Afghanistan with the American commanded OEF, and 
not NATO, is that a wedge was driven between NATO as an organization and the 
battlefield where its most important member was fighting its purpose-defining-war. 
This lead to the realization in European capitals that NATO needed to change in order 
to stay relevant and thus produced political unity, not division as one might have 
expected. In these initial years after the start of the War on Terror, the new paradigm 
wielded a politically unifying effect that allowed the allies to commit to a substantial 
revision of the organizational and military dimensions of the Alliance, which were two 
areas of transatlantic division revealed by the War on Terror. Given the organizational 
and military transatlantic division of the time, much of the direct and immediate “sharp 
end” output of this political unity was channeled through OEF instead of NATO.  
As the violence in Afghanistan increased from 2005 an on, and ISAF developed into a 
COIN operation, European caveats and lack of transatlantic burden-sharing were the 
sources of increasing political division across the Atlantic. Much of the underlying 
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source of this negative development was the miss-match between initial European 
expectations of what ISAF was to be, and what the hard facts on the ground dictated 
that ISAF needed to become. In 2003 the NAC agreed on the plan for NATO to 
assume responsibility for Afghanistan on the false notion that it would resemble a 
peacekeeping force, while the Americans would do the fighting through OEF. To 
allow for this misconception is perhaps the greatest flaw of the dual-track strategy of 
OEF and ISAF, and the greatest underlying cause of the increasing political division as 
the conflict has progressed negatively. Realizing this, the US has attempted to unite 
the two forces, but this was in self-interest vetoed by France and Germany.  
The analysis revealed that the initial political unity to a large extent has faded as the 
situation in Afghanistan has gotten progressively worse since 2006. It is, however, 
critical to note that this growing degree of political division, culminating in the 
extensive Americanization of the War in 2009, has not halted the organizational 
reformation and military transformation developments started at the Prague Summit in 
2002. The transatlantic capabilities gap is a less dividing issue today than it was in 
1999 (OAF) and 2001 (OEF). Europe has in this regard acted in order to “Keep the 
Americans in”, so to speak. With the aim of preserving a strong and relevant alliance, 
NATO has to a large degree transformed in accordance with US initiatives like the 
NRF and the PCC. Comparison of the commitment inherent in the DCI and the PCC, 
bares testimony to the fact that such a level of cohesion and unity was not present 
before September 11th 2001. 
In short, the impact of Afghanistan, in the context of the War on Terror, has moved 
from initially creating a high degree of political unity and exposing organizational and 
military division, to increased military interoperability and comprehensive, albeit 
flawed, organizational adaptation to American initiatives, and thus a lessening of the 
division in regard to these two dimensions. While the political unity since 2006 has 
suffered greatly mainly due to inadequate burden-sharing in Afghanistan. 
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5.2 Theoretical Implications 
Realist-based claims that the War on Terror initiated NATO’s permanent demise and 
divided the Allies, largely fall victim to their monolithic and one-dimensional 
analytical concepts of the Alliance. Long-term transformational processes that were 
created by the political unity at the 2002 Prague Summit are overlooked at the expense 
of rhetorical vitriol across the Atlantic. The analysis has showed that the two periods 
following 9/11 (2001 – 2006) was marked by American led transformation and 
European compliance, often times with direct reference to the terror attacks on New 
York and Washington. A reaction to an external threat that – paradoxically – is right in 
line with the expectations of classic realist theory.  
Knutsen (forthcoming) insists on the point of NATO by 2009 having developed into 
what he calls a “mulit-layred” alliance. He defines the concept as “ …an alliance à la 
carte, divided into several fractions of member states with divergent interests.” 
Knutsen’s main argument is that the ISAF operation has (among other factors) driven 
the alliance into being divided into a structure of three, and that the alliance cohesion 
that once could be taken for granted now must be built on a case-by-case basis. The 
members are divided into the distinct camps of a) those who which to strengthen 
Article 5 b) those who wish to prioritise out-of-area and c) those who are most 
concerned with bettering relations with Russia. I do not challenge that this is a quite 
accurate model of the present state of affairs in NATO. As the Albright Report (2010) 
and the debate surrounding the upcoming new Strategic Concept illustrates the good 
old “out-of-area contra Article 5” debate seems to never die. What I, however, do 
challenge is the notion that this “multi-layered” structure is a novel and devastating 
development in NATO history. In keeping with realist theory, the question rather 
should be to what extent the Cold War, and today the War on Terror, has managed to 
repress the ever present diverging “multi-layered” national interests of the allies, 
which when examined closer is far from always the case. During the 1956 Suez crisis 
the British Conservatives accused the US of “betrayal” and openly wondered if 
Alliance had come to an end (Healey 1959). Furthermore, in the eighties there were 
disputes over a number of issues, for instance: NATO’s response to the Soviet 
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invasion of Afghanistan, the difference between Reagan’s hard line and increased 
defence spending and the European line of arms control and détente, deployment of 
Pershing II missiles in Europe, and disputes over Soviet pipelines delivering gas to 
Europe (Theis 2009). In each instance NATO solidarity was mobilized and the alliance 
prevailed despite its differences.   
NATO has always to varying degrees been a multi-layered alliance composed of 
sovereign member states that are “in it for themselves”, so to speak. It is true, as 
Hallams (2010) among others have demonstrated, that this narrow rationality is 
heavily moderated by concepts of transatlantic and general alliance solidarity and 
shared values. None the less, both realism and liberal institutionalism presupposes that 
states are basically limited rational actors. Given that the geo-political situations, and 
several other factors, vary across the members, diverging interest patterns will always 
occur. The interesting question is whether the conflicts are subdued or played out, and 
why. In the case of Afghanistan it seems that transformation by Europe to meet 
American demands has been propelled by the War, and the allies have moved closer to 
each other in terms of the organizational and military dimensions. Much of this can be 
accredited to transformation programs such as the PCC and the NRF. However, the 
Afghan War, and ISAF in itself, has also been major drivers of European capabilities 
development and increased transatlantic interoperability. Ringsmose (2009:292-293) 
states that “There is little doubt that the ISAF operation has served as an important 
catalyst reorganization and increased investment in expeditionary capabilities” and he 
goes on to quote a senior British official in saying: “It is now Afghanistan that is 
driving transformation, driving the change in the capabilities that nations need to 
develop, becoming the test-bed for the relevance of the command structure...” (quoted 
in Ringsmose 2009:293).  
The analysis shows that the War on Terror as an overarching paradigm of American, 
and thus by extension NATO, security policy, to a significant extent, did manage to 
subdue differing national interests among the allies in the period from 2001 to 2006. 
This is evident, among other factors, through the European willingness to subcome to 
American leadership in the OEF coalition of the willing (2001 -2003). The agreement 
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on the PCC at Prague in 2002 and the strengthening of the commitment at Istanbul in 
2004, and lastly the Comprehensive Political Guidance on transformation at Riga in 
2006. However, the Riga Summit was also marked by increasing political divisions 
over Afghanistan. 
The disunity of burden-sharing on the ground in Afghanistan, and negative impact of 
European caveats limiting troop utilization became evident as ISAF progressed into 
southern Afghanistan in 2006. This speaks to members putting their own interest 
ahead of the common good, in effect almost acting as free-riders. This is an indicator 
of states behaving as presupposed in realist theory, when there is absence of an eternal 
force creating cohesion. The extensive national caveats placed upon most European 
troops lend credence to the realist perspective of lack of cohesion in such a context. 
This is in line with Brenner’s (1993) predictions of states pursuing “a more narrow 
conception of national interests” when operating in an environment that lacks a 
unifying threat. The European states have an interest in keeping NATO relevant, and 
thus choose to contribute troops. By confining them to the north, however, many of the 
allies leave all the heavy lifting to others, in line with their national interests – 
regardless of the common good. 
The dividing political effects of the Afghan War are heavily moderated by the 
unchanged fact that NATO represents a mutually beneficial institutionalization of the 
transatlantic relationship. Europe wields a significant influence over the US through 
the rule of consensus, and NATO secures the US a pacific and friendly ally in Europe, 
while facing emerging worries over a resurgent Russia and a rising China. All 
predictions of NATO’s death in Afghanistan are thus unfounded and greatly 
exaggerated. 
The fact that, the initial higher degree of political unity following 9/11 was not 
sustained when the allies faced greater risks, and were asked to make greater 
sacrifices, lends credence to the realist presumption of states amorally pursuing their 
narrow national interests. The continued organizational and military unity, in face of 
this increasing political division, is thus an expression of the common European and 
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American interest in a strong NATO. The liberal institutional claim, of shared values 
and a transatlantic bond as the glue holding the allies together, is significantly 
weakened by the European reluctance to act in accordance with the common good, 
through the extensive implementation of caveats. Hindering unified strategic planning 
and failing to shoulder its fair-share of the risk and burdens of the operation. The 
continued adaption of the organizational structure and military capabilities of the 
alliance, on the other hand, are in line with the self-sustaining and adaptable 
bureaucracy presumptions of liberal institutionalist theory. As a whole, in this case, 
realism has wielded the highest degree of explanatory power. Realism explains 
adequately both the unifying political reaction following 9/11, and the European 
investment in alliance transformation, as European Capitals realized this was needed to 
“keep the Americans in” and sustain a relevant Atlantic Alliance. 
5.3 Final Remarks and Further Research 
Once again, the fundamental inquiry that has motivated this entire thesis is: 
To what extent has NATO's Afghan engagement, so far, served to be a source of 
greater transatlantic unity, or a source of division, within the Alliance? 
The main lesson of the analysis is that it is highly beneficial to answer this question in 
a multifaceted manner, which allows for the inclusion of counter-working forces on 
separate dimensions within the Alliance. I now briefly outline the main developments 
for the entire period in question (2001 - 2010) in regard to each dimension. 
For the political dimension the Afghan engagement, as a whole, has been a source of 
greater transatlantic division, despite the initial reaction of unity following 9/11. The 
main source of this division is disproportionate transatlantic burden-sharing in 
Afghanistan. This division is, however, significantly moderated by a number of 
mutually beneficial transatlantic interests in a vivid NATO. The claims of NATO’s 
demise in Afghanistan are largely unfounded. 
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As for the organizational dimension the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 
revealed a transatlantic miss-match, in terms of an absence of expeditionary command 
structures in NATO. The establishment of the ACO and ACT, as well as the NRF, has 
made considerable headway in mending this division. However, the Afghan 
engagement has to a large extent out-competed the NRF for resources, and has thus 
also been a source of organizational division, in the sense that it has hampered the 
development of the NRF.  
In terms of the Military dimension, however, the NRF has been instrumental in the 
quite successful realization of the PCC. Furthermore, ISAF and the Afghan 
engagement has been a significant source of unity for the Alliance in regard to the 
issues of European capabilities development, and increased interoperability across the 
Atlantic. 
The novel structuring of the analysis into the three separate dimensions has proved to 
be an analytically fruitful move. It has allowed the analysis to encapsulate dimensions 
of the transatlantic relations within NATO otherwise overlooked, and thus arguably 
contributed to a higher degree of inner validity for the thesis. Future research on 
NATO, and other comparable organizations, could likely benefit from applying a 
similar differentiated structure. Interesting future applications would, among others, be 
an investigation of the longer term effects of the conclusions herein drawn from a still 
ongoing engagement. 
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